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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the long debate
over North Carolina's capital site, the motives and
considerations applied in the debate, and the significance
of the debate in the context of North Carolina's larger
political situation.
State government records, newspapers, private
correspondence, and secondary historical sources are used
to examine the nature of the debate. The capital debate in
North Carolina began in 1676 with the first attempts to
establish a seat of government in the northern part of the
province of Carolina. The debate did not finally end until
1791, when officials selected a site, later named Raleigh,
as the new seat of government.
The issues of convenience, healthy situation, and
economic advantage influenced this debate. Concerns for a
healthy, convenient capital site became less pronounced
after the American Revolution while economic motivation
developed to a greater degree during that time.
Sectionalism proved to be a constant factor in the
debate from 1730 through the capital's final settlement in
1791. The changing pattern of sectionalism in the capital
debate illustrated both the diminishing importance of
convenience and the growing significance of economic
issues. The maturing of North Carolina's trade system
enabled new, conflicting sectional alliances to develop and
fight bitterly over the choice of the capital site.
Officials often used the capital debate as a tool to
maneuver other more significant sectional issues.

"THE MOST PROPER AND CONVENIENT PLACE"
THE DEBATE OVER NORTH CAROLINA'S SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, 1676-1791

CHAPTER I
"SOME FITTING PLACE"
THE SEARCH FOR A CAPITAL, 1676-1730
Jonathan Urmstone was bitter and frustrated.

His role

as an Anglican minister in the province of North Carolina
was a difficult task in 1711, made even more trying because
the provincials were witholding from him useful (and
valuable) books which would greatly aid his work.

The

Reverend Doctor Thomas Bray of England had brought the
library to Bath Town, under the mistaken belief— so
Urmstone contended— that the town was North Carolina's
capital. In numerous letters to the Society for Propagating
the Gospel, Urmstone lamented the refusal of "that famous
city of Bath consisting of 9 houses or rather cottages" to
release the books.

Deriding the town as "a remote, obscure,

dangerous place" and one that was "inconsistent with any
other part of the Colony", he pronounced in 1712, "That
place will never be the seat of Government."1 In one sense
Urmstone1s prophecy came true:
Carolina's official capital.

Bath Town was never North
Paradoxically, he was also

wrong, for on several occasions the town was indeed used as
the seat of government.

Although the proprietors who ruled

North Carolina until 1729 rejected Bath as a possible
location for their capital, in less than ten years after
2.

MAP 1
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Counties in the Albemarle faction included Currituck,
Pasquotank, Perquimans, Chov?an, Bertie, and Tyrrell.

4.

their sale of the province to the English crown, the royal
government began moving back and forth between several
towns, including Bath.
The period of itinerent government has been described by
A. Roger Ekirch in his book, "Poor Carolina11: Politics and
Society in Colonial North Carolina. 1729-1776. and, to a
lesser extent, by Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray
Newsome in North Carolina:

History of a Southern State.

Ekirch, Lefler, and Newsome properly ascribed the lack of a
permanent seat of government between 17 36 and 17 65 to a
sectional dispute between northern and southern regions
over travel convenience and economic advantage.2 The
location of the capital, however, was merely one part of the
sectional controversy, which also revolved around equal
assembly representation and the payment of land taxes
called quitrents.
Neither Ekirch nor Lefler and Newsome analyzed the
changing importance of the seat of government issue to the
larger regional squabble. Perhaps more important, both
works included only minimal background information on North
Carolina's seat of government before 1736.

Ekirch began

"Poor Carolina" with the colony's change from proprietary
to royal status in 1729, but he did mention the proprietary
capital of Edenton.

Lefler and Newsome began their history

of North Carolina with the first European explorations of
the region, but only noted twice that an "unofficial"

5.

capital existed before the sectional controversy began.
the more recent Colonial North Carolina:

In

A History. Lefler

and William S. Powell make no mention of the original seat
of government.3
In actuality, by 17 3 6 North Carolina had enjoyed an
official capital for at least fourteen years.

The Lords

Proprietors desired a seat of government for the northern
part of Carolina as early as 1676, and chose Edenton in
172 2.

North Carolina's government took on its itinerant

nature when growth of settlement south of the Albemarle
region arroused discontent with the location of the
original capital as well as sectional disagreement over the
location of a new seat of government.

The southern faction

made a bold attempt to establish New Bern as the official
capital in 1746, after which the capital temporarily lost
importance as a sectional issue even though the controversy
between regions continued.

In 1754 the royal authorities

refused to recognize New Bern as the official capital, thus
making North Carolina's seat of government again an
unsettled matter.

The capital would remain unsettled until

New Bern achieved official status as the chief city in 1765.
Eventually, the American Revolution would again unsettle
the seat of government and launch the new state into yet
another period of governmental itinerancy and political
intrigue over the location of the state capital.

6.

Permanent European settlement of North Carolina
(excluding the settlement of Roanoke Island in 1587)
probably began in the mid-seventeenth century.

At that

time, settlers began drifting down to the Albemarle Sound
region from Virginia (see Map 1) . In 163 3 eight Lords
Proprietors received a royal charter for the region called
"Carolina", which lay between Florida and Virginia.
Instructions to the governor and council in 167 6 gave the
first evidence that the Lords Proprietors desired a seat of
government for the northern part of Carolina, called
"Albemarle".

The instructions urged fortified settlement

of the south side of Albemarle Sound and the establishment
of three towns to serve as ports for Albemarle County.

The

first of the three towns was to be "upon Roanoke Island
which wee will have bee the Chiefe towne and the place for
the Councell and assembly to meete".4
Three years later the Lords Proprietors clearly
expressed their desire for a capital in northern Carolina
in their instructions "to John Hearvey Esqr. President and
the Councell of the County of Albemerle in the Province of
Carolina".

The Proprietors had appointed Seth Sothel as

governor of Albemarle in 1678.

John Harvey, president of

the council, governed the county while Turkish captors
detained Sothel in Algiers.

John Jenkins succeeded Harvey

as governor until Sothel finally arrived in 1683.5

7.

Although Harvey's instructions, unlike those of 1676,
did not specify an actual location for the capital, they did
state that the seat of government should be in an
appropriate site:
You are to choose some fitting place in a
Collony whereon to builde the Cheefe towne
of Albemarle in the Choice of which place
you are to have Regarde to health [, ] plenty
and Easy Access, you are to endeavor to get
the Parliament to Raise wherewithal 1 to
build a house for the meating of the
Councell and Parliament in the said towne
and when the Said house is erected the
Councell and Parliament are always to Sitt
there and also the Surveyors Registers and
Secretarys offices are there to be kept and
in no other place and also the Court of
Common please and Sessions of the
peace. . . ,6
The Proprietors certainly had no intention of fostering an
itinerant government.
The instructions to Harvey not only indicated the
Proprietors' intentions for a seat of government, but also
set forth principles that would dominate the selection of a
capital throughout the eighteenth century.

A "fitting

place" with "plenty and easy access" denoted convenience— a
town to which inhabitants and British vessels could easily
travel.

The Proprietors were also concerned for a healthy

site for they knew well that areas around the Albemarle and
Pamlico Sounds could be harmful.

Also, the instructions

illustrated that, though the choice of a capital site was a
matter of royal prerogative, the assembly's approval of the
choice was necessary for the funding of government

8.

buildings.

Furthermore, efficient government required a

fixed location for records, offices, and officials.

All

these factors would later influence the eighteenth-century
debates concerning the seat of government.
Harvey's instructions also introduced economic
considerations:

"and you are to get the Parliament to pass

an Act that noe Store Shall be kept Strong Drink or any
goods Sould by Retayle but in the Said Towne and you are to
cause all vessells that shall come into Albemarle River
there to Loade and Unloade as by our Fundamentall
Constitutions is Required".7 Acts limiting retail goods
and alcohol to the capital went unenforced in the
eighteenth century; nevertheless, a capital site's
economic advantages were as obvious to the Proprietors as
they would be to sectional factions after 1736.

Ekirch

explained that, "inevitably, the establishment of a
permanent seat of government would bring new men and new
money to the designated town and its environs".8
Furthermore, the capital would be a port, and Carolina's
unenforced Fundamental Constitutions, written by John
Locke in 1669, declared that the first port on a river would
"be a port town forever" and would have a monopoly on
trade.9
The Lords Proprietors repeated these designs for a
capital in the 1681 instructions to Captain Henry
Wilkinson, "Governor of That Part of the Province of

9.

Carolina that Lyes 5. Miles Southe of the River of Pemplico
[Pamlico] and From Thence to Virginia".

The Proprietors

announced Wilkinson's appointment as governor, replacing
John Jenkins, in the hope that a stranger to the Carolinians
would be able to examine the province's troubled past and
"doe equal justice to all partyes".10 The published
Colonial Records give no more mention of Captain
Wilkinson's administration, but Charles M. Andrews has
described the financial troubles and imprisonment which
prevented this governor from travelling to North Carolina.11
Though the lords instructed in vain, they stressed the
importance of a capital in their plans for the colony.
The Proprietors reiterated their intentions for
establishing a capital in private instructions to Governor
Philip Ludwell in 1691:

"You are to use yor uttmost

endeavor to make a setlemt of a Towne remote from the Sea to
be hereafter the seat of the Govern^."12 Quite likely the
Proprietors, in this latter instruction, feared unhealthy
situations near the sounds, yet distance from the sea would
not greatly affect "plenty and easy access" as long as the
river of the chosen site was not too shallow for deep-draft
ships.
Despite early plans for a capital, towns did not develop
in North Carolina until the early eighteenth century.

The

first town, Bath, established in 1706, actually developed
on the Pamlico River, south of the center of population

10

around the Albemarle region (see Map 1) . Governor John
Harvey organized the area around the Pamlico and Neuse
Rivers as Bath County in 1696, and the county was divided in
1705 into Pamlico, Wickham, and Archdale counties.

Bath

Town, located in Pamlico County (later renamed Beaufort
County) received no praise from Jonathan Urmstone who
considered it in 1711 to be "the most inconsiderable place
in the country".

His opinion, however, surely reflected

his problems with acquiring Dr. Bray's library, and his
letters show him to be a constant complainer on many
subjects.

Sandra Tyler Wood has stated that "the lack of

dependable financial help given by the inhabitants tainted
Mr. Urmstone's whole outlook on North Carolina".13
William Gordon, an earlier Anglican minister, gave a
more objective description of Bath in 1709.

He commented on

the smallness of the town— only twelve houses— and its
inablility to upport a minister, but then conceded "it is
not the unpleasantest part of the country— nay, in all
probability it will be the center of trade, as having the
advantage of a better inlet for shipping, and surrounded
with most pleasant savannas, very useful for stocks of
cattle".

In 1716 Governor Charles Eden made Bath an

official port, yet the town never grew to any significant
degree.

New Bern, a near neighbor, soon eclipsed it.14

In 1710 Baron Christoph Von Graffenried founded New Bern
south of Bath at the juncture of the Neuse and Trent Rivers.
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Upon arriving in North Carolina, Von Graffenried discovered
that the land he had bought was not a choice site.

John

Lawson, his surveyor, placed the settlers "on the south
side of this point of land along the Trent River, in the
very hottest and most unhealthy position, instead of toward
the north, on the Neuse River, where they could have been
better placed and in a more healthy locality".

New Bern's

unhealthy location was a subject of lament throughout
eighteenth- century discussions of the location of a
capital, and in 1765, an unknown French traveller
graphically described the unhealthy and unpleasant nature
of the town.

Although the Frenchman cited all of Carolina

as unhealthy, he suspected lowness of land to be a chief
cause and attributed New Bern's specific condition to "the
stagnateing waters of these great rivers where there is no
tide or Curent but what is occasioned by the winds.

[I]n

hot Calm Days youl see a thick scum on the waters, which
occasions a disagreeable stench".15
Thomas Alonzo Dill has questioned the unhealthiness of
New Bern's situation in a series of articles on the
eighteenth-century town.

According to Dill, if the site

had been as unhealthy as Von Graffenried claimed, "an able
frontiersman like Lawson would hardly have chosen this spot
for his own dwelling".

Dill also noted that Von Graffenried

chose practically the same site to rebuild the town, later
praising the situation.16 In mentioning naturalist John

12 .

Brickell's descriptions of North Carolina towns, Dill
stated that "like every other eighteenth-century writer,
Brickell admired 'the pleasant Prospect' of New Bern on its
two rivers".

While there is merit in Dill's questioning of

Von Graffenried's statement, Brickell*s praise of New Bern
has little significance when compared to his descriptions
of other North Carolina towns.

Brickell described Edenton,

Bath, and Brunswick as "pleasently seated", the former two
having "delightful Prospects" on their rivers.

New Bern

and Beaufort both had "pleasant Prospects". Dill did quote
without refutation the French traveller's comments on the
unhealthiness of New Bern, thus conceding to some degree a
poor reputation of health for the eighteenth-century town,
a reputation which would affect its consideration as a
capital site throughout the century.17
Von Graffenried's settlement was almost completely
demolished by the Tuscarora War in 1711.

Although it

received greater proportionate damage than did Bath Town,
New Bern quickly recovered, growing larger than the earlier
town and receiving a greater share of the trade.

Yet, North

Carolina officials chose neither Bath nor New Bern as the
seat of government.

Possibly, Bath's lack of growth and New

Bern's unhealthy situation influenced that decision.
Another factor may mistakenly seem to have been
accessibility from England:

although the lower Neuse and

Pamlico Rivers were quite navigable, Ocracoke Inlet, the

13

passageway through the Outer Banks, allowed no ships that
drew more than ten feet of water.

Neither navigation nor

health, however, was a factor in the decision, for Edenton,
the town actually chosen as the seat of government, used
Ocracoke Inlet in lieu of the more dangerous, though
nearer, Roanoke Inlet, and also had a reputation as an
unhealthy site.18
•

•

Rather, centrality of location was the

dominating influence on the choice of an early capital.
Despite the early growth of towns in the Neuse-Pamlico
region, the majority of North Carolina's population— and
most of its leaders— resided around the more northern
Albemarle Sound.

The desire for a capital easily

accessible to the population— the Proprietors' early
intention— would also play a major role in debates after
1736.
An effort to establish a seat of government occurred in
1715 with a law to build an assembly house and courthouse at
the forks of Queen A n n e 's Creek in the Chowan Precinct on
the Albemarle Sound.

The site also hosted Governor Charles

Eden's residence and was incorporated as Edenton in 1722.
An act of 1722 for "Enlarging and Encouragement of the Town
called Edenton" clarified the role of the new town as a seat
of government, requiring various "publick officers under
the penalty of five pounds p'r Month to keep their Several
and respective Offices by themselves or Sufficient Deputies
within the Said Town of Edenton". Although an assembly

.

14

house was never built there, Edenton continued as North
Carolina's seat of government after the end of proprietary
rule in 1729; the town was the sole location for council
meetings until 1734 and for assembly meetings until 1736.
John Brickell noted that in 17 37 Edenton had been the "Seat
of the Governors for many Years".19
Historians have offered different interpretations of
Edenton as capital of North Carolina.

According to Lefler

and Newsome, Edenton was only an unofficial seat of
government.

Enoch Lawrence Lee noted in his history of the

lower Cape Fear region that Edenton "sometimes served as
the seat of provincial government though it was not
officially designated the capital of the province".

Samuel

A'Court Ashe, however, described the town as "the
established seat of government". 20 Some differentiation may
•

•

•

•

have been drawn, at least on Lee's part, between a seat of
government and a capital.

"Capital" was rarely used to

describe a chief city for North Carolina until the end of
the eighteenth century, for even in the debate after the
American Revolution, "seat of government" was used rather
than "capital".

In such discussions throughout that

century— and even before— the desire was clearly for a
capital in the modern sense, which is indeed a seat of
government.

Thus Alonzo Dill rightly swept away any

differentiation when he wrote that in 1722 "Edenton had
been made the seat of certain provincial officers and of the

governor if he so chose; and thus in a legal sense but more
strongly in a customary sense the town was the capital of
North Carolina".

No act required courts to meet there, but

"Edenton was indeed the capital if by capital one meant the
seat of the governor and, more important, the meeting place
of the assembly".21
As the first capital of North Carolina, Edenton was
representative of the slow growth of towns in the province.
William Byrd described the place in his 1728 "History of the
Dividing Line". Byrd accentuated the underdevelopment of
North Carolina in relation to his native Virginia, and
though the unpleasant work of surveying the border between
the two colonies colored his views, his description of the
young capital is insightful:
This Town is Situate on the North side of
Albemarle Sound, which is there about 5
miles over. A Dirty Slash runs all along
the Back of it, which in the Summer is a
foul annoyance, and furnishes abundance of
that Carolina plague, musquetas. There
may be 40 or 50 Houses, most of them Small,
and built without Expense. A Citizen here
is counted Extravagant, if he has Ambition
enough to aspire to a Brick-Chimney.
Justice herself is but indifferently
Lodged, the Court-House having much the
Air of a Common Tobacco-House. I believe
this is the only Metropolis in the
Christian or Mahometan World, Where there
is neither Church, Chappel, Mosque,
Synagogue, or any other Place of Publick
Worship of any Sect of Religion whatever.22
The Reverend Urmstone might have agreed completely with
Byrd's description, though Edenton was even larger than
Urmstone's Bath.

16 .

The Moravian Bishop Augustus Spangenberg also commented
on both the smallness and unhealthy situation of Edenton,
though at a later period, during his 1752 trip through the
province.

Spangenberg noted that "Edenton is said to be one

of the oldest towns of America, but it is hardly one quarter
so large as Germantown [Pennsylvania], though it is well
situated on a rather large Sound".

By Edenton's good

situation, the bishop must have meant its view or access to
navigation, for he lamented the site's unhealthiness:
All this section of North Carolina lies
low, and there is much water, fresh and
stagnant, which breeds fever every year,
and many die from it. . . . W e believe’that
we caught the fever in Edenton and brought
it with us, for there is so much fever in
that town that hardly anyone gets through a
year without an attack. It lies low,
surrounded by water, which has neither ebb
nor flow on account of the sandbanks, which
lie between North Carolina and the sea, and
hinder the tide.23
Edenton and New Bern were to share more than a seat of
government; they both shared unhealthy conditions for their
residents.
Though unhealthy and slow-growing, Edenton was the
official seat of government during the 1720's and early
1730's.

The town's tenure as captal was brief, for new

forces began pulling North Carolina's governmental
workings away from the Albemarle after 1734.

A new locus of

settlement in the Cape Fear region, separated from Edenton
by some 150 miles and several river crossings, made the
location of the seat of government inconvenient for a

growing number of North Carolinians (see Map 1) . The
existence of two vastly separated and competing centers of
growth also hightened the significance of economic
advantage associated with a capital site.

As some Cape Fear

settlers attained sufficient political power to challenge
Albemarle assemblymen on significant sectional issues, it
is not surprising that such discord included the location
of the capital.

18 .
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CHAPTER II
"A GREAT INCONVENIENCE AND CHARGE": THE SEAT
OF GOVERNMENT DURING THE EARLY ROYAL PERIOD, 1729-1754
Edenton functioned as North Carolina's capital as early
as 172 2.

Shortly thereafter settlement in the lower Cape

Fear Valley began which would eventually affect Edenton's
status as a seat of government.

The lower Cape Fear lay in

the southeastern region of North Carolina, called
"Clarendon County" by the Proprietors, a region closed to
settlement since 1667.

Lefler and Newsome attributed the

settlement restriction to the area's dangerous coastline,
the threat of Indian attack, and the greater value placed in
more northern regions.

After settlers began arriving in

the area, George Burrington, as proprietary governor,
reopened the area's land office.

The southern settlement

contrasted with the earlier settlement of Albemarle by
quickly establishing its first town, Brunswick.1
Maurice Moore laid out and named Brunswick after
receiving a large grant of land on the west bank of the Cape
Fear River.
1729

The assembly declared the site a township in

and mentioned it an address to Governor George

Burrington in 1731.

"We understand there is a town already

Established on Cape Fear River," they explained, "and we
are informed it is like to be a flourishing place Reason of
20 .
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its Excellent Situation for the Trade of those Parts."
Indeed, Brunswick did have a better entrance for ships than
the more northerly ports.

The assembly then made a

statement which was perhaps ominous for the new town; it
offered assistance to promote Brunswick "or any other Place
on that River that shall be judged more proper".2
Another "Place on that River" developed shortly
thereafter.

The village of Newton was founded sixteen

miles above Brunswick, and a 173 9 law erected it into the
town of Wilmington.3 However, in 1740, a movement by
Brunswick interests to repeal the Wilmington law produced a
factional struggle.

The Brunswick group argued that "many

People did undertake to build and actually built, several
good Houses, and made great improvements in and about the
said Town [Brunswick] some years before the Village of
Newton was erected", and claimed that the Wilmington law
"would be attended with great injustice, in as much as it
deprives those persons of the fruits of their labour and
expense".

A crucial point to their cause was that water

depth and navigation at Brunswick were "notoriously known
to be superior to those of Newton". The Wilmington faction
conceded that the banks below Brunswick allowed ships of
two feet greater draft than did Wilmington's banks, but
emphasized Wilmington's "healthy Scituation and fine
Springs".

Moreover, they claimed Brunswick to be "the most

sickly unhealthy place in the whole Colony", owing to its
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"unwholesome Water and the Pernicious Vapours rising from
the Ponds and Marshes with which it is almost Surrounded".4
The law incorporating Wilmington withstood attack, and the
newer town quickly surpassed Brunswick in size and trade.
The settlement of the lower Cape Fear region did not
immediately affect North Carolina's seat of government.
While George Burrington served as royal governor from 1731
to 1734, the council, assembly, and general court continued
to meet in Edenton.

This stability, however, concealed a

desire on the part of Governor Burrington and his council to
remove the seat of government from Edenton.

Whereas

formerly the governor resided in the Albemarle region,
Burrington had moved near the Cape Fear River.

As early as

1725, Burrington possessed a grant of five thousand acres
on the Cape Fear and later built a plantation near
Brunswick.
governor.

Thus Edenton was no longer convenient to the
This fact worried many freeholders from Bertie,

Edgecombe, and Craven precincts (see Map 1) . These
precincts lay on different river systems northeast of the
Cape Fear River, and would thus compete with more recent
development to the south.

In April 1773 a total of 420

Bertie men petitioned Governor Burrington concerning the
capital:
[T]here is a Discourse among us that you
design to move the Seat of Government to
the lower part of Cape Fear River which if
done will prove a great inconvenience and
Charge to four parts of the Inhabitants out
of Five.
We are sensible for many
reasons Edenton is a very inconvenient
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Place for the Seat of Government and much
more may be said against the settling it at
Cape Fear River.
Therefore we humbly desire and hope Your
Excellency will take proper measures for
fixing the Seat of Government near the
Centre of the Province which we suppose is
between Tar and Neuse River which will give
a general Satisfaction to almost the whole
Province and greatly promote the Speedy
peopling of the unsettled part of this
Country. . . .
The 110 petitioners from Edgecombe made basically the same
request, as did 2 69 from Craven, though the latter— being
further south— supposed the center of the province to be
"on the South side of Neuse River".5 Burrington did not
move the capital anywhere, though the records are silent as
to the petitioners' influence on his inaction.

The

requests do show, however, that thoughts of moving the seat
of government from Edenton occurred at several levels of
the political framework before the period of itinerant
government began in November 1734.
The change of governorship that November took place
rather dramatically.

November 6, Burrington called an

assembly in Edenton and was having some degree of success
with the representatives— an unusual circumstance— when on
the thirteenth he heard the proclamation that Governor
Gabriel Johnston had published his commission in a council
meeting on the Cape Fear.

Not only did this event mark the

end of an unsuccessful and frustrating governorship, but it
also marked the end of Edenton's monopoly of provincial
meetings.

In November and December of 17 34 the councils met
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in Brunswick and New Hanover (the precinct including the
lower Cape Fear region) . The following year, the council
shifted between Edenton, Newton, New Bern, and Bath, and
then continued to shift between these four towns and
Brunswick for the next twelve years.

The general assembly

also moved between New Bern, Edenton, Bath, and Wilmington
from 1736 to 1747.6
Motivated by the new Cape Fear settlement, agitation for
a new capital fostered the development of an itinerant
government in the 1730's and 1740's.

The movement to

disestablish Edenton as capital possessed an influential
spokesman in Governor Burrington's successor, Gabriel
Johnston.

In a list of orders sent by Johnston to the Board

of Trade in 1736, he complained, "[t]hat as the holding all
the Courts particularly that of Chancery where all the
Members of his Majesty's Council are oblidged to attend at a
Place so near the extremity of the Province as Edenton is
found to be by experience very inconvenient".

Johnston

requested that the court of chancery, consisting of the
governor and council, be held at New Bern, "at present the
most central place of the Province", and that council
members be obligated to attend.

Johnston further desired

to "remove the other Courts to Newbern" and that "all other
offices be for the future kept in the said Town of Newbern.
Any Law Custom or Usage to the Contrary notwithstanding".
Governor Johnston, in a letter accompanying this order

explained his request to the Board of Trade:
The 7th Article your Lordships will find
very reasonable if you please to consider
that Edenton is within thirty miles of the
Virginia line and Two hundred miles
distant from Cape Fear where most of the
council have their Habitations and
Newberne is much nearer the center of the
Province. I have not been able to hold
above two Courts of Chancery since I came
into the Province upon this account. If
there is any Law confining the Courts to
Edenton it is more than I know but if there
is it was never confirmed by the Lords
Propietors. . . .7
Early in 1744 the governor continued this theme in an
address to the council and assembly.

Declaring that it was

"high time" to think seriously of "a proper arid convenient
place for holding his Majesties Courts, for fixing the
publick Offices and transacting the Business of the
Colony", Johnston poignantly stated his case:
When all the parts of this Province except
such as were contiguous to the Virginia
Line was but thinly inhabited, when your
dealings were but small and navigation
inconsiderable, when the soil of the whole
province was the property of the Crown,
there was then no great hardships in
continuing the seat of Government where it
has been for several years past[,] in
allowing the Officers to keep the publick
Records in their private Houses and giving
their attendance twice or thrice in a year.
. . But now Gent when the Province is
peopled quite up to the head of Peedee
River which was formerly reconed in South
Carolina[,]a when the number of the people
towards that Colony are so much
increased [, ] when your commerce and
navigation are so considerable augmented
and so large a portion of the Lands in the
Neighbourhood of Virginia are no longer
his Majesties property.9
In these circumstances it is highly
necessary to appoint a place nearer the
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centre of the Country where his Majesties'
Courts may be held[, ] where Offices may be
built for keeping the publick registers
and Officers obliged to give constant
attendance for the dispatch of Business
without hurry or confusion.10
Johnston's argument concerning the seat of government
contained two main thrusts.

With his call for a central

location for the capital, the governor invoked the old
factors of "plenty and easy access" both for North
Carolinians and for navigation from outside the colony— "a
proper and convenient place". His motivations may have
been genuine desire for practicality and personal
convenience for himself and his council, rather than for
economic gain; his major landholdings lay in the Cape Fear
region, not on the Neuse River or in the Albemarle region.
Ulterior motives for economic gain, however, were more
plausible.

Johnston spoke of moving courts and offices to

New Bern, but he secretly hoped to move the seat of
government to the Cape Fear region.

Upon Wilmington's

incorporation he wrote in a private letter, "In a year or
two I hope to get all the Publick Business done there
[Wilmington] . But this must be done by degrees."

Success

at moving the capital to New Bern would facilitate an
eventual move to Wilmington.

Such an event would not only

be convenient for him and his council, but would also be an
economic boon for them as landholders.11
Johnston's desire for "fixing the publick Offices" and
the concern for less confusion meant a single location for
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the seat of government— a desire also shared by the
Proprietors in 1681.

Johnston expounded on this second

thrust of his argument in an address to the council and
assembly later in 1744.

"One great cause of all these

misfortunes is the want of a fixed place for the dispatch of
publick business.

It is impossible to finish any matter as

it ought to be while we go on in this intinerant way."

He

then concluded, "We have now tried every Town in the Colony
and it is high time to settle somewhere."12
In complaining of itinerant government, Johnston
reacted to a situation he himself helped develop by his
active efforts to move the seat of government from Edenton.
The governor determined the assembly’s meeting place, and
after 173 6, the assembly consistently met in various towns.
Both the governor and the majority of the council—
representatives of royal authority— were associated with
the Cape Fear region and desired a more southerly seat of
government.

Why did they not, then, establish a fixed seat

of government more favorable to their location? Why did
Johnston perceive a need to work by "degrees"?

Though the

choice of the capital site was a matter of royal
prerogative, Johnston knew, as did the Proprietors in 1681,
that the popularly elected assembly had to agree to the
location because the assembly controlled the funds to
finance public buildings.

Johnston slyly understated his

dependence on the assembly in a 1744 address:

"I am
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sensible I have it in my power to settle this point with the
advice of his Majestic's Council, but I assure you I cannot
without great regret determine a matter that is of so much
consequence to every man in the Province without your
consent and concurrence which I shall always be glad to be
guided by."13
Johnston needed the assembly's approval for a capital
site, and although most of the council had their
"Habitations" in the Cape Fear region, the majority of the
assembly did not.

A law dating from 1670 allowed five

counties in the Albemarle region to send five delegates
each to the assembly, Bertie County three, and other
counties only two.

This distribution created a majority

representation for Albemarle interests.

The testimony of

Katherine Rutledge of New Bern, who, with her husband, had
kept a "House of Entertainment" in 1739 frequented by
Albemarle representatives, illustrated both the
representatives' use of the northern majority and their
view on the capital issue:
[S]he understood that the Assembly was
broke up by means of some of the Members
withdrawing and absconding in the Bushes
from whence it was usually called the Bush
assembly. And that she often heard the
assemblymen that used their House talk
that they would not consent to the removing
the Publick Business or the seat of
Government from Edenton.14
Albemarle assemblymen thus countered Governor Governor
Johnston's attempts to create a new official capital.

It is
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possible that some men from Albemarle desired a centralized
seat of government rather than the possible risk of a
capital at Wilmington, as the Bertie petitioners did in
173 3.

Such an attempt was not formalized again until 174 6,

but until that time the governor, by calling assembly and
council meetings away from Edenton, succeeded in
dislocating the seat of government in practice if not in
theory.
By 1746, the Albemarle representatives had compromised
on the issue of a new seat of government, agreeing to a more
southerly location.

At New Bern in June, the assembly

passed a bill to fix the place for the seat of government at
Bath Town, located on the Pamlico River just south of the
Albemarle region (see Map 1) . The council, which served as
the upper house of legislature, returned the bill to the
assembly with several amendments, stating that "the Place
for Establishing the General Court etc" they "must insist
to be New Bern instead of Bath".

New Bern lay just north of

the Cape Fear region, on the Neuse River.

John Wynns, of

Bertie County (Albemarle) described the situation in a
later testimony:
[T]he Council thereupon sent a Message to
the House of Burgesses insisting that they
should strike out Bath Town and incert
Newbern in the room thereof. . . upon which
the Question was put in the House of
Burgesses and was carried in the
Negative [, ] whereupon the Assembly was by
his Excellency the Governor prorogued to
Wilmington to meet in November. . . Mr.
[Matthew] Rowan [a council member] said
that unless the Burgesses would consent to
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fix the seat of Government at Newbern they
might depend there would be no Business
done, for tho' the Majority of the
Burgesses lived at the North, the Council
were at the South, and they could put a
Negative.15
Thus, the northern and southern factions— roughly the
assembly majority versus the governor and council— were
stubbornly divided between the sites of Bath and New Bern.
The governor had the right to prorogue, or postpone, an
assembly to meet again at any other place.

Johnston, seeing

that the Albemarle faction had matched his forces on the
capital issue prorogued the assembly to meet in November at
Wilmington.

He hoped the Albemarle representatives would

be unable— or would simply refuse— to travel such a long
distance, thus giving his interests control of the
assembly.
In "Poor Carolina” Ekirch gave much attention to this
regional division.

He observed the break "occurring

roughly just beneath the six counties bordering Albemarle
Sound".

Ekirch attributed the gap to differing urban

centers and trade outlets as well as differences in
commodities and slave labor.

Major sectional issues

included the establishment of equal assembly
representation and a new, fairer policy of land taxation,
both of which the northern faction opposed.

Although

regional conflict occurred in other British North American
colonies, Ekirch claimed that only in North Carolina did
the conflict result in attempts to upset traditional
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governing systems.

He saw the cause of this development in

basic political conditions and attitudes— fragile
institutional authority, indifference to government, and
the lack of a responsible ruling group.16 Thus, the
north/south controversy actually had a much larger scope
than simple disagreement over the seat of government.
What, then, was the seat of governments importance to
the larger sectional clash?

In June 174 6 the issue seemed

of paramount importance, for it brought hostility between
the groups to a climax in the Wilmington prorogation.

The

issue which provoked this stand-off and Johnston's severe
action was neither tax reform nor representation; rather it
was a choice for a capital— between two towns only thirty
miles apart.

A severe confrontation on such an issue would

be understandable if the two factions represented the towns
involved, yet the great majority of these hostile groups
were from neither New Bern nor Bath.

The seeming importance

of the issue, however, may be misleading, for Johnston had
tried a similar tactic in 1741 over a stand-off on
quitrents.

The greatest motivation for the stubborn stands

on the capital issue would seem to be convenience.

Although

New Bern and Bath were close, they were connected by two
ferries, one two miles and the other four.

In a letter to

the Board of Trade discussing the site for a capital, Arthur
Dobbs, Johnston's successor, implied that in North Carolina
the ferries were unpleasant additions to a trip and should
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be avoided if possible.17 The Albemarle representatives may
have refused to accept New Bern in the well-founded fear
that the capital would later migrate even further south.
Economic motivation was probably less important.

Bath lay

just south of the Albemarle region, so northern interest
undoubtedly favored economic growth there rather than in
New Bern.

Cape Fear and New Bern were a great distance

apart, but potential economic growth at a New Bern capital
probably aided the alliance between Cape Fear interests arid
the Neuse River region.

Johnston, of course, also may have

been thinking ahead economically to a move from New Bern to
Cape Fear.
These motivations, though valid, may not explain fully
the unbending positions taken at that June 174 6 assembly.
Perhaps a more satisfying explanation would be that the
capital issue, in itself, was not of paramount importance
in the stand-off.

Rather, the issue was a show of strength

by both factions.

Neither faction capitualted in their

choice for a capital because other issues were involved in
the power struggle; one capitulation would lead to others
by strengthening the opposing faction.

A second

examination of Matthew Rowan's threat to the assembly,
recorded in the testimony of John Wynns, betyrays the
character of a "power play".

Rowan allegedly said "that

unless the Burgesses would consent to fix the seat of
Government at Newbern they might depend there would be no
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Business done, for tho' the Majority of the Burgesses lived
at the North, the Council were at the South, and could put a
Negative".18 Was the clash really over the choice of a
capital, or was it mainly an attempt by each faction to show
once and for all who would rule North Carolina?

The larger

issues and hostilities found expression, to some degree, in
the argument over the seat of government.
The events following the November assembly in Wilmington
support this interpretation.

As the assembly gathered, The

Albemarle representatives remained at home.

After two

prorogations Governor Johnston began the assembly, which
met with only fifteen of fifty-four members present.

The

first act passed equalized assembly representation and the
second "fixed a Place for the Seat of Government" at New
Bern.

The assembly also passed quitrent and paper currency

acts which favored southern interests.

Johnston prorogued

the assembly back to New Bern and then ordered new
elections.

When the Albemarle counties still elected five

representatives each, Johnston declared their elections
null and void.

Albemarle representatives did not attend

the assembly for eight more years.19
Both the northern reaction to the Wilmington assembly
and the governor's subsequent actions showed the minimal
importance of the seat of government to the sectional
stands.
King.

Albemarle politicians appealed the actions to the

Their "humble Petition" denounced the prorogation to
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Wilmington as deceitful and devious, attributing their own
absence to the difficulty of travelling such a great
distance.

They also protested the assembly's meeting

despite lack of a quorum and claimed the representation act
to be a violation of "Ancient Rights and Priveleges". No
complaint was made, however, regarding the establishment of
New Bern as the new seat of government, thus indicating the
issue's minimal importance.

Some agitation against the new

capital may have existed, however, for in 1748 Johnston
complained:
One mighty inconvenience we have to
struggle with at present is, That nobody
cares to lay in Provisions for Man or Horse
at Newbern, tho' it is the most central and
fruitful part of the Province; Such pains
are taken to assure the People that the
Seat of Government will be removed, when 20
they get their five members restored . . .
•

•

Johnston's complaint could easily have been an
exaggeration or an excuse for New Bern's lack of growth.
Alonzo Dill accepted Johnston's explanation and blamed a
depression in New Bern on the actions of the Albemarle
faction.

However,

Dill states that the Wilmington

assembly's 174 6 creation of a capital at New Bern
instigated a boom in new taverns and ordinaries which
lasted until 1749.
complaint?

On what, then, did Johnston base his

Further, to blame New Bern's lack of growth on

threats of removal by the Albemarle faction makes no sense
when one realizes that earlier in 1748 Johnston himself
began a movement to remove the capital from New Bern.21 Yet,
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even if accepted in full, these childish threats against
New Bern did not give an acceptable indication of the
capital's importance to the northern faction.

The issue of

the seat of government paled in comparison to that of
assembly representation.
Bishop Spangenberg also indicated the relative
unimportance of the capital issue in the conflict which
raged during his trip through North Carolina.

Although

Spangenberg was well aware of the inconvenience many
underwent travelling to the capital— he suggested the
creation of two seats of government— in his account of the
conflict he made no mention of the capital site as an issue:
There is discord between the Counties,
which has greatly weakened the authority
of the Legislature, and interferes with
the administration of justice. The reason
is this,— and I hear it from both sides:
When the Colony was still weak the older
Counties were permitted to send five men
each to the Assembly. After a long time
the Colony increased in size, and new
Counties were formed, but were allowed
only two representatives each. That
continued until the newer Counties were
numerous enough to have the majority in the
Assembly: then before the older Counties
realized what was being done, an Act was
passed reducing the representation of the
older Counties to two each also. This
irratated the older Counties, and they
refused to send anyone at all to the
Assembly, but dispatched an agent to
England to try to regain for them their
ancient rights. . . .22
Spangenberg was mistaken in his belief that the Albemarle
faction had lost their majority through natural growth, but
he did perceive a definite reason for the older counties'
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stand— representation.
The actions of the governor and council after the
establishment of New Bern as the seat of government also
indicated that the southern faction had stood for its
selection for more reasons than just a genuine desire to
have it as a capital.

The legislative journal of 1748

presented a further discussion on the seat of government:
His Excellency the Governour was pleased
to recommend it to the Council whether
instead of New-Bern the present Seate of
Government, it would not be more Eligible
to make and Establish the same upon Trent
river [, ] the publick Buildings not being
yet erected at New Bern pursuant to Act of
Assembly in regard to the known
unhealthiness of the former place from the
badness of the water and other Causes, And
the want of proper Accomodations in the
said Town.
The Council having considered of his
Excellency's Motion were of Opinion that
there was sufficient Reason for removing
the Seat of Government, and that Trent
river would be a proper place whereon to
fix the same? and that when a particular
place has been pitched on a Bill should be
brought in for that purpose.23
The council had met in New Bern eight times— at the least—
before the assembly of 1746? certainly the governor and
council had prior knowledge of New Bern's unhealthiness and
lack of accommodations before pressing for its acceptance
as the seat of government.

Lack of accomodations was in

itself a poor reason to disestablish New Bern as capital,
for none existed at the Trent River site while New Bern was
in the midst of a boom in new ordinaries.

They probably had

desired New Bern over Bath because the former was nearer
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Cape Fear, but dissatisfaction with New Bern indicated that
they mainly wanted to thwart the stubborn Albemarle
faction.
In 1746, before the discussions on removal of the
capital from New Bern, Johnston answered the northerners'
appeal by presenting his own case to the London
authorities.

The governor accused the northern faction of

maliciously subverting the progress of government by
withdrawing from assembly meetings to prevent the passage
of bills unfavorable to them.

A major point in his defense

was that the northern representatives boycotted the
Wilmington assembly:
When I prorogued the Assembly in June last
till the middle of November next then, to
meet at Wilmington, they entered into a
formal Agreement not to attend, and to
engage as many of the other Members as they
could influence to stay at Home. . . .
[A]fter two small Prorogations to render
their absence inexcusable, we proceeded to
Business and passed this Law now under your
Lorships consideration and another for
fixing the seat of Government. . . .24
During the ensuing investigation, John Wynns denied knowing
of "any Confedaracy of the Northern Burgesses not to meet at
Wilmington".

Katherine Rutledge, however, testified that

she "frequently heard divers of the Northern Members of the
Assembly held at Newbern June 1746 speak bothe before and
after the Assembly was Prorogued to Wilmington that they
would not go thither".25
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Despite the investigation in 1749, an official decision
was delayed until 1754.

On March 26 of that year, the

Committee of Council for Plantation Affairs recommended
that the representation act and the act fixing New Bern as
the seat of government be repealed.

The repeal of the first

act was a decisive victory for the Albemarle faction.
Ekirch, however, attributed the disallowal of the second
act, which, in addition to a seat of government, also
established courts, to the developing British policy of
strengthened royal prerogative.

The act was rejected

"partly on the grounds that only the governor could
establish courts".26
Whatever the reasons for the act's disallowance, the
instructions to Arthur Dobbs, appointed governor in 1754
following Gabriel Johnston's death, clearly illustrated
the new status of North Carolina's seat of government. On
June 17 the Board of Trade directed, "that you do likewise
forthwith consider of a proper place for the seat of
Government and make Report thereof to Our Commissioners for
Trade & Plants in order to be laid before us for our further
directions therein".27 North Carolina's seat of government
was once again an unsettled question.

The instructions to

Dobbs, like those to John Harvey in 1679, expressed the
desire of a ruling body for a capital in North Carolina.
The new governor would struggle with the same
considerations set forth by the Lords Proprietors.

Between
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the two sets of instructions, North Carolina experienced
the establishment and dislocation of two different seats of
government, and endured an itinerant government shifting
among several towns.
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CHAPTER III
THE CURSE OF "PESTIFEROUS ANIMALCULAE"
THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT DURING DOBBS'S ADMINISTRATION
1754-1764
"Many and various have been the Disputes in this
Province, with Regard to fixing upon a proper PLACE for the
Seat of Government."

So began James Davis' 1764 account of

the capital dispute in his North Carolina Magazine. In his
article, entitled "Newbern's Remembrancer:

Or, An Essay on

the Seat of Government", Davis gave a brief history of the
capital issue during Johnston's administration.

Noting

that "this Matter was the great Bone of Contention", and
describing the sectional nature of the dispute as well as
the northern advantage in the assembly, Davis presented the
capital stand in a New Bernian perspective:
At Length, by the great Industry and
unwearied Diligence of Governor Johnston,
an Equilibrium was effected, and a Law
passed for settling the Seat of Government
at Newbern? but as this Law abridged the
Northern Counties of some Privileges,
application was made to England for a
Repeal of That, and some other Laws. After
several Years Sollicitation, this Matter
was determined in their Favour, and a
Repeal of those Laws sent over by his
Excellency Arthur Dobbs, Esq? who was then
appointed Governor of this Province on the
Death of Mr. Johnston.1
That the debate over the seat of government was really
the "great Bone of Contention" for the northern and
42 .
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southern factions is doubtful, for this and other
controversies developed from the question of balance of
power in the assembly.

To James Davis, a New Bern resident

and politician, the capital issue had greater importance
than it did to the Cape Fear or Albemarle factions, for New
Bern had been strongly in the running for the seat of
government.

A New Bern resident supporting Johnston's

stand for the town would also see the governor's efforts as
effecting an "Equilibrium", when in fact Johnston had
prorogued an assembly meeting to a place inconvenient to
his opponents and then defied quorum restrictions to get
his bills passed.

Despite Davis' emphasis on the capital

issue's importance, he nevertheless admitted that
opposition to the Wilmington laws developed from the
abridgement of northern privileges in the assembly.
The date of Davis' article was, however, 1764— a decade
after Johnston's New Bern law had been repealed.

Davis was

writing long after Johnston's administration ended.

The

capital issue remained unsettled throughout Arthur Dobbs's
administration and continued to reflect dissensions within
North Carolina's political sphere.

The continued debate,

as in Johnston's administration, involved aspects inherent
to the placement of a seat of government:
healthy situation, economic advantage.

convenience,
The Lords

Proprietors had considered these factors in their 1679
instructions to John Harvey concerning an appropriate site.

.
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These aspects, however, ranked low in priority during
Dobbs's administration when men used the controversy as a
mere tool to accomplish other objectives.
With Arthur Dobbs's instructions of 17 54, the Board of
Trade instituted a new era in the search for North
Carolina's permanent seat of government.

Instructed to

"forthwith consider of a proper place for the seat of
Government and make report thereof", Dobbs nevertheless had
other urgent matters to consider as he took office.2 The
new governor's first priority was to bring order out of the
regional conflict.

North Carolina needed a stable

political situation both to attract new settlers and to put
forth a united defensive effort with the outbreak of the
Seven Year's War in 1754.
disinterested newcomer.

Arthur Dobbs, however, was not a
As early as 173 5 he owned large

land grants in New Hanover Precinct (see Map 1) and in the
growing piedmont area and had recently been an active
supporter of the Albemarle faction.

Despite these earlier

entanglements in the province, Ekirch claimed that Dobbs
successfully "eschewed partisanship during the early years
of his administration", enabling "an uncommon period of
political peace during the mid-1750's".3
Dobbs's initial assembly, at New Bern on December 12,
1754, was a momentous occasion in that the Albemarle
representatives participated for the first time in eight
years.

The new governor called for a united effort for the

.
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good of the province and diplomatically postponed the
election for Speaker until all the representatives arrived,
resulting in the choice of an Albemarle representative.
James Davis commented on the period of peaceful politics
following this assembly.

"A General Coalition seemed to

take Place", he observed, "a Sacrifice seemed to have been
made of all private Animosities and Party-Content ion, and
the Streams of Government now seemed to flow in a smooth and
unruff led Channel." This idyllic phase, however, lasted
only a few short years.

Davis noted, "the great Mutability

of all Human Affairs soon clouded this Serenity."4
Ekirch attributed the short-lived tranquility to a
variety of causes.

The 1754 Privy Council edicts ended the

argument over representation in Albemarle's favor.

Growing

Anglo-French hostility and then the outbreak of war
threatened the province sufficiently to make unified action
desirable, a need reinforced by a threat of slave
insurrection in 1752-53.

The sudden willingness of

Virginia merchants to accept paper money from North
Carolina eased some regional tensions.

The aging of

factional leaders and the desire by both factions to gain
the new governor's favor also worked to modify
beligerance.5 Despite the resulting calm, however, the
capital issue was still much alive in the mind of Governor
Dobbs.
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Unlike the previous two governors, Dobbs fixed his
residence in New Bern.

This made perfect sense to Davis,

"the Seat of Government having been before settled at
NEWBERN, and That being the Centre of the Province".6
Governor Dobbs, however, never had any intention of fixing
the capital at New Bern.

In a letter to the Board of Trade,

dated November 9, 1754, Dobbs revealed his plans:
As soon as the seat of Government is fixed
which I apprehend at present will be upon
News [Neuse] river, above this town [New
Bern] , as far as it may be navigable for
flat bottomed boats, in case I find the
Lands good, and situation healthy, as it
will be nearer the back settlements which
increase very fast, and is most Central,
and this town will still be the place where
the merchants will reside and ships be
entered, and both the gentlemen to
northward and southward, seem to like it as
the great Ferries at Edenton and Bath will
be avoided? and it will be equally near
Cape Fear, as this place, and more
healthy. . . .7
Dobbs clearly desired a more central location for the
capital than New Bern offered. He perceived that a westward
move would be more convenient to both Albemarle and Cape
Fear residents and would perhaps cement a relationship
between the coastal community and the province's rapidly
growing backcountry.

Although Gabriel Johnston had

attempted to move the seat of government further west of New
Bern, on the Trent River, Dobbs was first to state nearness
to back settlements as a motive for such a move.
Interestingly, Dobbs was also the first officially
appointed governor to own large tracts of land in the
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piedmont, thus having personal interest in a westward
shift.

Thus, a desire to profit economically from a new

capital location may have influenced Dobbs's efforts.

The

area which he suggested did lie nearer his tracts than did
New Bern.

In fairness, however, Dobbs expressed the desire

to remove as little business from New Bern as possible.
Dobbs also believed that the new site would be healthier
than New Bern.

Requesting from the assembly the

establishment of funds for public buildings, Dobbs stressed
his "command from his Majesty to look out & fix upon a
convenient and healthy situation for the seat of Government
& Courts of Justice", stating that "the Credit & increase of
the trade of the province depends in a great measure upon
the healthiness and Increase of the Capital, and having all
the public Offices together".8
Dobbs later revealed another motive for movement of the
capital site.

In a 1756 letter to the Board of Trade, the

governor complained that New Bern had "no convenient
houses. . .but most indifferent houses not 30 feet long and
2 0 wide exposed to the weather".

In his biography of Dobbs,

Desmond Clarke inferred from such complaints that lack of
"suitable buildings for business purposes" as well as the
lack of a "suitable Governor's house played equally
important in Dobbs's dissatisfaction with either New Bern
or Wilmington as a capital site.9
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The unhealthiness of New Bern would become the major
issue of the capital debate during Dobbs' administration.
Dobbs once described the town as "very aguish" and
complained "the Water here [New Bern] is very bad[, ] the
land low and sandy with some Marshes near it which adds to
•
the Moisture
and heat m•

the summer and autumn". m

considered the situation so serious.

Not all

James Davis not only

insinuated the contempt with which some of the town's
residents held Dobbs' health concerns, but also the
proportions which the health issue took:
Newbern did not agree with SOME
Constitutions? the Air and Water were
judged contagious: the Gentlemen of the
Faculty were consulted? who gave it as
their Opinion, that the Air and Water of
Newbern were replete with pestiferous
Animalculae, and that the only Way to
preserve Health in those that drank it, was
to boil it, which would volatize the
Spirit, and cause the slimy Noxtiae to
gravitate? or rather to mix with it a
proper Quantity of good Jamaica, which
would break the Cohesion, and cause the
pestiferous Animalculae to subside. In
short, the PLACE was disagreeable, and a
NEW ONE must be found.11
Arthur Dobbs set out to find such a new place on April 9,
1755.

Travelling up the Neuse River he viewed favorably the

site of Tower Hill, forty to fifty miles above New Bern near
a site called Stringer's Ferry.

Dobbs described Tower Hill

as "fine rising ground from the Ferry, dry, healthy and good
springs? and extends a considerable way pretty level back
from the river,

where the lands are very good, altho' they

are piney at some distance from the river."

Upon his
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return, Dobbs himself purchased the land at Tower Hill with
the hope of establishing a new capital there— George City,
in honor of King George II.12
In May Dobbs sent a letter to the Board of Trade
"relating to the place fixed upon him for the seat of
Government".

Although the Lords of Trade commended Dobbs's

early "zeal and regard" for the province in his decisive
actions on the capital issue, they were perhaps worried by
his aggressive and independent attitude and reminded him
who controlled the province's purse:
We have no doubt from the Account and
description you give us of Stringer's
Ferry upon Neuse River, that it is a proper
place for the Seat of Government but we are
inclined to believe that His Majesty will
not think it advisable to give any positive
directions, without having the sense of
the People taken upon it in the next
Session of the General Assembly. . . .
Making it even clearer, they continued, "it appears to us
that such directions would be ineffectual, unless there are
Assurances from the People that they will make a proper
Provision for erecting publick Offices and for such other
Services as will necessarily require expense".

They

further proposed a joint address from the council and
assembly to the crown.13
An assembly motion, resolved with no dissenting vote on
October 12, 1756, prepared the way for Dobbs's Tower Hill
address.

The motion declared the town of New Bern an

"Improper Place for the Seat of Government and the Meeting
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of the General Assembly being found by many years
Experience from the Badness of the Air and Water thereof to
be exceedingly unhealthy". With New Bern thus out of
contention, Dobbs addressed the assembly four days later
about a new capital site.

He informed them that the Board

of Trade thought it "proper to advise his Majesty that it
should be somewhere on the River Neuse [, ] but as this
Province must be at the Expence of erecting several Publick
Buildings his Majesty will not fix the Place untill the
Assembly of the Province view the several Situations on the
River and represent by Address to him which Place they think
will be most Healthy and convenient".

Dobbs desired that

the assembly view the situations on the river and "choose
the most convenient place".14
Although the governor instructed the assembly to "view
the several Situations on the River" which he had nominated
and then from these sites choose a place for the capital,
the assembly made no such restrictions in their
instructions to survey committees. On October 16, the
assembly resolved to send eleven men "to view the river
Neuse and that they or a majority of them report their
Opinion to the next Session of Assembly what part of the
same is most suitable to fix the Seat of Government and they
also report their Opinion of any other Place or places".
Similarly, a committee of five was commissioned on October
2 3 "to view the several situations of the River Neuse and
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such other places as they think proper for that purpose."15
This discrepancy of thought between governor and
assembly demonstrates that, though both may have been
unsatisfied with New Bern as a capital, the assembly was not
completely charmed by Dobbs's great plans.

In fact, the

assembly took no decisive action on the Tower Hill issue for
more than two years.

"An Act for erecting a City on Neuse

River, upon the Plantation called Tower-Hill, fixing the
Seat of Government therein, and building a Governor's
House, and public Offices in the same", was not proposed
until November 17 58.

The first section of the act

stipulated the necessity of fixing a capital and voiced the
traditional concerns for the choice of a site:

"Whereas, it

is absolutely necessary, that the Seat of Government shold
be fixed . . . at a proper healthy Place, as central as may
be to the Inhabitants of this Government."

A second section

seemed to relate the findings of the survey committees:
"Tower Hill . . . in Dobbs County, hath been found to be
healthy and agreeable, having the natural Advantage of a
pleasant temperate Air, high and dry-Land and wholesome
Spring."

The third section noted the governor's ownership

of the property and set aside all 850 acres for the sole use
of the city.

The Tower Hill Act was finally signed by the

governor on December 22.16
The length of time the assembly took to affirm Governor
Dobbs' plan for a capital belied the possibility that the
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acceptance of Tower Hill was not a straightforward
development.

The assembly's pleasant description of Tower

Hill also indicated that other motives besides desire for
an appropriate site were in play, for Dobbs's land may not
have deserved such praise.

James Davis desired the capital

to remain at New Bern, and his tongue-in-cheek description
of the new site discredited it as a perfect choice.
Describing it as a place "about 40 Miles above Newbern,
pretty pleasantly situated on a high Hill, about a Quarter
of a Mile from the River, having an impenetrable Morass or
Swamp in Front, and the River ALMOST navigable for
Canoes."17 The full impact of the Tower Hill Act's
suspicious description of the site, however, is found in
addresses from the assembly and council to the crown
requesting the repeal of the act.

In 1762 these bodies

complained that the site at Tower Hill "is found extremely
difficult of access either by Land or Water, to most of the
Inhabitants of this Province". As a seat of government they
found it "entirely unfit and Improper for that Purpose[,]
lying at a great distance from any navigable Water and at
Certain Seasons of the year Extremely difficult of
access".18
The complaints of the 1762 assembly and council
certainly cast doubt on their 1758 counterparts' acceptance
of Tower Hill on the grounds of appropriateness of site.
Other motives were involved in the creation of the Tower
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Hill Act, revealed in the events related to the capital
issue between Dobbs's 1756 address and the 1758 act.

The

two-year lapse indicated a reluctance to accept Dobbs's
land as a capital site, but several factors transformed
this reluctance into a firm choice of the site.
Fortunately, the "great deal of caballing and management"
over the seat of government prompted Governor Dobbs, in a
letter dated January 22, 1759, to "write fully upon it" to
the Board of Trade, so at least one side of the story is
clear.19
The transformation began, strangely enough, with the ill
health and inadequate accomodations of Governor Dobbs.

The

governor was unhappy with the "small house at a high rent"
in New Bern which he "was obliged to pay without either
Garden or field to keep either horse or Cow".

The New Bern

site was also "in a low unhealthy situation" which caused
Dobbs to have "several relapses in Fever and agues".

Dobbs

informed the Board of Trade that because there were "no
hopes of fixing on a place for the seat of Government" early
in 1758, he had inquired for a new residence and was offered
an incompleted house near Brunswick in the Cape Fear
region.

Clearly the assembly had failed to agree on the

Tower Hill site, but Dobbs's move to the Cape Fear in the
spring of 1758 gave him a new strategy to force an
agreement.

This strategy was clear in his own description

to the Board of Trade:
I last Spring moved my family thither, and
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proposed holding Assemblies alternately at
Edenton and Wilmington to prevent any
jealousy between the Northern and Southern
Inhabitants. This however alarmed the
Gentlemen in the north lest hereafter the
seat of Government might be fixed at Cape
Fear ,v as it has the best navigation in the
Province, and they made me a proposal to
fix the seat of Government upon Neuse in
the situation
I precommended
to your
•
o
**
Lordships. . . .
Once again, North Carolina faced the uneasy situation of
a governor residing in the Cape Fear region.

In 17 33

settlers petitioned Governor Burrington in fear that he
would remove the capital to the lower part of the Cape Fear
River.

In 1746 Governor Johnston achieved the passage of

controversial bills by proroguing the assembly to
Wilmington.

In 1758 northern representatives evidently

felt threatened— quite likely with good reason— that
Governor Dobbs would establish the capital at Cape Fear, in
practice if not in law.

The assembly latched upon Dobbs's

Tower Hill site as the lesser of two evils.
Dobbs's strategy, actually a form of blackmail,
succeeded for the moment.

The form which this success took,

however, demonstrated the tentativeness of the agreement
between the governor and assembly.

The act for fixing the

seat of government at Tower Hill and erecting public
buildings should have been passed with a suspending clause-a clause which prevented a bill from taking effect until
word of the crown's approval had been received.

The crown

frowned upon or repealed bills passed without such a

55 .

clause, but the colonies at times took advantage of their
distance from England by not adding a suspending clause to a
bill which offered no promise of royal approval in order to
benefit from the act until orders to repeal the bill arrived
from the crown.

Royal governors were generally instructed

not to pass such bills.

The Tower Hill Act passed without a

suspending clause, as Governor Dobbs explained:
[T]his I consented to, and thought upon
your Lordships having approved of it in
case they addressed His Majesty upon it to
lay them under an obligation of paying for
the buildings, I might venture to pass such
a Bill without a suspending Clause which
they thought would delay the building,
since His Majesty, if He disapproved of it
would repeal the Bill, and if it were
delayed, they might change their mind and
not fix the seat of Government.21
The suspending clause, or lack of it, presents an
interesting problem in the passage of the Tower Hill Act and
the psychological games being played by the governor and
assembly.

Governor Dobbs implied that the assembly urged

him to pass the bill without a suspending clause because
they did not want to delay the building of public offices
until word of approval returned to North Carolina.

The

explanation is unacceptable, for the assembly had put off
any decision on the capital for two years— and would have
likely continued their indecision had not Dobbs created
fears of moving the capital to Wilmington.

Also, since the

assembly was sufficiently underwhelmed with the choice of
Tower Hill, it is unlikely that they would have been anxious
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to begin building offices there at public expense.

Dobbs

may have been completely truthful, however, in asserting
that the assembly urged him to forget the clause on the
grounds of speedy building, for the representatives may
have used buildings as an excuse to get the bill passed
without a suspending clause, knowing that such a bill would
probably be vetoed by the crown.

On the other hand,

Governor Dobbs may well have been gambling— against the
odds— that the bill would pass even without the clause,
hoping that the Lords of Trade would not miss the golden
opportunity to bind the colonists into paying for the
public buildings.

Dobbs evidently knew that the assembly

was so lukewarm on the agreement that, if passed with a
suspending clause, "they might change their mind and not
fix the seat of government” before the crown’s approval
reached the province.22
The assembly, however, was far from innocent in
accepting Tower Hill in the face of Wilmington overtures.
The representatives actually used the Tower Hill Act in
some blackmail strategy of their own.

Governor Dobbs and

the assembly had been at odds over issues involving the
power of provincial treasurers.

Dobbs desired greater

control over these men— especially in determining their
tenures and auditing their accounts.23 In 1758 a related
controversy arose when Parliament allotted 200,000

to the

colonies as a reimbursement for military expenses during
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the Seven Years 1s War.

North Carolina's lower house

created a grant bill which would give the province's share
to the two public treasurers for disbursement.

Knowing

that such a plan would not win the approval of a governor
already fighting to limit the treasurer's powers, the
assembly, in December, hoped to use the unwilling Tower
Hill agreement to force through their grant bill— by
putting the bills together as a package deal.24
In his letter to the Board of Trade, Governor Dobbs
explained the development of this grant bill and the
factional nature the treasurer issue had taken.25
Governor Dobbs saw this bill as threatening to royal
prerogative.

He noted that the assembly attempted to

enhance the bill by assuring Dobbs of reimbursement for
attendance at a Philadelphia military conference and "the
rent of my house for the time past which were at my private
expense, thinking I would break through my instructions and
pass a Bill which so greatly affected His Majesty's
Perogative and the Power of the Governor and Council".26
Dobbs objected specifically to the lodging of the
granted sum in specie with the treasurers and the proposed
appointment, without his approval, of an agent to obtain
the grant.

This agent would receive instructions solely

from the assembly through its committee of correspondence.
The assembly, however, "insisted upon it that the first
Bill for the seat of Government should not pass unless the
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other went with it, as hand and glove”27 Thus the assembly
returned blackmail for blackmail, refusing to pass the
Tower Hill Act unless the governor agreed to their grant
package.

This was a gamble on the assembly's part, for

representatives had already voiced fears that Dobbs would
begin meeting the assembly at Wilmington— the governor
could do this without officially fixing a seat of
government.

These representatives must have been aware of

a keen personal desire on Dobbs's part to have the capital
at Tower Hill— a desire so great it would tempt him to
approve such a distasteful grant proposal.

Less likely,

the assembly's fears of a move in the seat of government may
have been contrived, leading Dobbs to believe his blackmail
had worked, while in reality setting the governor up for the
grant scheme.

The previous history of the capital issue,

however, supports the view that the assembly was acting on a
legitimate fear, but saw the allottment as a means to
benefit from their Tower Hill compromise.

In any case, the

assembly depended on Dobbs' desire for a capital on his own
property.
Governor Dobbs may well have been motivated by the
chance of personal gain— Tower Hill was, after all, his own
possession.

Dobbs's biographer, Desmond Clarke, discounts

this possibility entirely.

When asked by the assembly for a

proper price for the capital site, the governor had
replied, "as you have thought it the properest place for the
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seat of Government from its Healthy situation and being
most central for the Ease of the Inhabitants (though I
should have been glad that it had been fixed on any other
convenient Situation) I shall desire no more than the
original sum which it cost me” .28 Clarke viewed Dobbs's
reply as proof against the charges "that he purchased the
Tower Hill property with the avowed intention of utilising
it as a site for the seat of Government and reaping a rich
return on the sale of land". That Dobbs did indeed purchase
the site with "the avowed intention" of a capital is clear
from the records.

True, Dobbs made no profit from the sale

of the capital site, but Clarke further asserted that Dobbs
"never pressed the Assembly to purchase his property, nor
did he show the slightest desire to enrich himself at the
expense of the province".29 Both these claims are doubtful
in the face of the pressure Dobbs asserted on the removal of
the capital to Cape Fear, the assembly's hesitance at
accepting Tower Hill, and the fact that Dobbs purchased
other porperty near the proposed capital site.

Earlier in

Dobbs's biography, Clarke quoted a private letter of 1755,
in which the governor confided to a friend to have
purchased a plantation of 900 acres about
ten miles from here [New Bern] on a fine
navigable river . . . and will be at a
reasonable distance of the seat of
Government. Whether I fix it here or
higher up the Neuse river I shall be within
an easy day's journey of it. I have taken
out a war rent to have a patent for 1,000
acres more in my daughter Fanny's
name . . . which . . . I design to give her
as an addition to her portion which will be
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very valuable once the capital is paid.30
Dobbs did not give the location of his daughter's property,
and used "capital" in its economic rather than geographical
meaning, but the governor did own at least 900 acres between
New Bern and Tower Hill.

The possibility of self interest

in Dobbs' desire for a capital west on the Neuse is made
plausible by these lands and the governor's possessions in
the back country.

The assembly may well have been appealing

to financial motives in using the Tower Hill Act to tempt
the governor.
The ball did not lie in the assembly's court for long.
Dobbs confessed to the Board of Trade that "upon this fine
spun scheme I thought to finesse as well as they".
According to North Carolina legislative procedure, a bill
had to be passed by both the lower house and the upper house
three times— not becoming law until the third passage by
the upper house (council) and the governor's signature.

In

his "finesse", Dobbs spoke to his friends in the council,
asking them "not to oppose the 2d Bill until the third
reading except in some trifling amendments".

When the

lower house had passed both bills for the third time, Dobbs
assembled the council and informed them that the second
bill was "of an extraordinary nature which affected His
Majesty's Prerogative and the rights of the Governor and
Council", showing them articles of his instructions which
conflicted with the bill.

Although some council members
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suggested a suspending clause would validity the bill,
Dobbs successfully persuaded them not to pass it.

The

council passed the first bill for the third time,
establishing the seat of government at Tower Hill, but
postponed reading the second bill, thus enabling
prorogation before even considering the bill.31
The governor's success naturally provoked the lower
house.

Dobbs described the hostility:
[U]pon this Disappointment the Lower House
were all in a flame, the managers being
greatly disappointed; & represented to me
that there must be a Dissolution unless the
upper House would resume the Bill,
desiring I would speak to the Council to
revoke their resolution, and pass the
Bill— I told them I thought it was
unprecedented, but they were to have no
restraint put upon them.32

When the assembly met again in May 1759, the lower house
renewed its attempts to gain control of Parliament's grant,
sending James Abercromby to England as its own agent.

The

grant issue, however, was then divorced from the capital
site, the former resolved in 1763 to the favor of the lower
house.33
The Tower Hill Act which failed to achieve the
assembly's purpose in 1759, faced a bleak future, for the
lower house never wholeheartedly approved of the site.

The

exact route of the act's death, however, is uncertain.
James Davis was vague in describing the fate of the capital
site:
But as there was another Bill to have
passed at this Time, and have gone Hand in
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Hand with it . . . the Loss and Miscarriage
of that Bill so benumbed and froze up the
Spirit of the other, that poor Tower-Hill
was neglected, and the great Ardor of the
commissioners for building the City of
G E O R G E , quite dissipated.34
That there was much "Spirit" to "freeze up" was debatable,
but the plans for George City certainly did fall by the
wayside.

Samuel A 1Court Ashe asserted that in April 17 59

the Board of Trade instructed Dobbs to repeal the act fixing
the seat of government at Tower Hill, for the lack of a
suspending clause.

This instruction was accompanied by the

disallowance of six other statutes, including a judiciary
act establishing superior courts.

Governor Dobbs delayed

enforcement of the judiciary repeal for practical reasons,
and may have also done little to execute the Tower Hill
repeal.35 In any case, the act was still alive and kicking
in 1762, for the assembly then began fighting it bitterly.
Hugh T. Lefler asserted that the law was promptly
disallowed when "the Privy Council learned that this site
was located on lands owned by Dobbs personally and that
there had been charges of speculation and corruption in
getting the statute passed".36 Lefler did not clarify,
however, if these reasons applied to the 17 59 repeal or to
the ultimate repeal after 1762.

That the royal colonial

administration had been unaware for seven years that the
potential site originally belonged to Arthur Dobbs is
highly unlikely.

As late as June 1762, however, the Lords

of Trade showed both willingness to support a capital at
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Tower Hill and suspiciousness of the act.

The Board, having

received confused correspondence "concerning that part of
the money appropriated for building a City upon Neuse
River", were "totally at a loss to guess" Dobbs's
connection between the act and the past Parliamentary
grant— already allocated:
[H]ad this Act been passed, as it certainly
ought to have been, with a Clause
suspending its execution until the King's
Pleasure had been known your meaning would
have been obvious [, ] but as there is no
such Clause and as the Share of your
Province . . . has, we suppose been long
since received by the Agent, we know of
nothing that can prevent the Act from being
carried into execution unless his Majesty
should repeal it which we shall not take
upon us to advise, so long as the Reasons
that induced the passing it and which
appeared from your Letters to the late
Board to be so well founded in reason and
good Policy stand unimpeached.37
Petitions from both houses of the assembly to the crown for
repeal of the Tower Hill Act, made in April and December of
that year, enabled the Board to infer that Dobbs's reasons
were not "so well founded" after all.
The Tower Hill controversy, as had the capital issue
during Johnston's administration, began in the context of
much larger conflicts between the governor and the
assembly.

James Davis gave a picturesque account of the

growing tensions of the late 1750's and early 6 0 's.
"DISCONTENT sat on every Brow, and warm Messages and
Answers passed between the Governor and the Lower House of
Assembly.

It would be tedious and disagreeable to wade
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thro' all the Hot Water of these Times . . . .1,38 The "Hot
Water" by 17 60 mainly consisted of the Parliamentary
allottment, a superior court bill, and a military aid
request:

all engendered strong disagreement.

The lower

house received a leader in Thomas Child, agent of John
Carteret, Earl of Granville, who was proprietor of the
northern half of the province.

Child, having been absent

from North Carolina for nine years, returned in 1759 and
regained his post as attorney general.

Dobbs appointed him

to the council in 1760, but Child, having pretensions to the
governorship, allied with the lower house, convincing the
representatives that his influence with Granville could
achieve Dobbs's dismissal.

On May 23, 1760, the lower house

met in a closed, secret session and adopted an address to
the king composed of fifteen complaints against Governor
Dobbs, requesting his dismissal.

One of the resolves

complained of Dobbs's removal of public papers to Cape
Fear.

Dobbs learned of the address, but was busy in

battling the assembly over other vital issues.

The house

rejected the governor's compromise on the courts bill, but
when he prorogued the assembly for three days, the
representatives finally consented to it on May 26.

Dobbs,

however, rejected the assembly's military aid bill and
prorogued the assembly until September.

Then, following

the lead of his predecessor, Dobbs changed his mind and
called a June assembly meeting in Wilmington, probably

65.

hoping Child and his "Northern Junto" would boycott the
session.39
Dobbs 's opponents did indeed forego the long trek to
Cape Fear, and the governor achieved the passage of his aid
bill, suceeded in skillfully thwarting the lower house's
attempts at his dismissal, and witnessed the dissolution of
his opposition.

Ekirch asserted that the remaining four

years of Dobbs's administration "witnessed a return to
relative political tranquility".

Although disputes

continued, most ended in compromise or in a direct ruling
from the Board of Trade.40 The capital issue, however, was
never settled during Dobbs's administration.

In fact, from

1760 to 1764 animosity over the location of the seat of
government increased.
In remembering 1760, James Davis described an impending
doom in stark contrast to Ekirch's peaceful scene:

"And now

the Cloud that before was only seen at a Distance, began to
gather thick, and the Storm threatened to break over our
Heads!"

The worst of the storm, as Davis perceived, was

Dobbs's removal of government functions to Cape Fear:
[T]he Seat of Government was totalled
removed to Wilmington; Assemblies, Courts
of Chancery and Claims, were there held;
the Secretary's Office was translated to
that See, and a C A R T dispatched to
Newbern for PUBLIC RECORDS. Now it w a s ,
that those who were dissatisfied with the
Seat of Government at Newbern, and wanted
it nearer Home, saw it, too late, removed
farther off; saw it removed 100 Miles
farther, to the Southern Extremity of the
Province; saw it removed to a sandy Desart,
to which they could not approach, but at
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the Expense of their Horses Hoofs!41
Davis' subjective lament of Wilmington did relate the true
fact that by 17 61 complaints concerning assembly meetings
in Wilmington arose not only among New Bern and northern
representatives, but also among house members from the
back-country.42
These complaints sparked little sympathy on Dobbs's
part, but they did move him to give a bit of advice.

James

Davis described that "[i]n this Situation of Affairs, great
Complaints were made; and his Excellency the Governor was
pleased to tell the People, the Fault lay at their own
Doors, why did not they Address his Majesty to settle the
Seat of Government, as he could not pass a Bill for that
Purpose?"43 In response the houses sent a joint address to
the king in April 1762, asking for the repeal of the Tower
Hill Act— because of that site's poor qualities—
requesting the seat of government be established at New
Bern, and promising to erect there a governor's residence
and other necessary public buildings.44
The April address, however, met with no success and the
assembly instigated another petition on December 1, 1762.
On that same date Dobbs petitioned the assembly to be paid
the principal and four years interest of the Tower Hill
purchase price, asserting that he "never Interferred with
The Land nor received any Benefit from it".45 No answer to
Dobbs was recorded, but the assembly spent much time
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preparing their address to the king.

A joint committee from

the assembly and council examined the problem.

The

resulting petition spelled out the unfit situation of Tower
Hill, "lying at a great distance from any navigable Water
and at Certain Seasons of the year Extremely difficult of
access, to most of the Inhabitants of this Province".

The

petitioners also recommended "the Town of New Bern in
Craven County as being in our Humble opinion more Central
and Convenient than any other part of this Province for
transacting the Business of the Public".46
Still, not all involved were agreed on the choice of New
Bern as the capital.

The Council representatives to the

joint committee protested that "however fond we may be of
getting the Act for fixing a seat of Government at Tower
Hill repealed, We cannot agree that at this time it is
necessary to address His Majesty to fix the seat of
Government at any certain place more especially at the Town
of New Bern". They gave four reasons why such a request
should not be made at that time:

North Carolina's

southwestern border was still unsettled, New Bern could
claim neither the best navigation nor the most central
location, the town was notoriously unhealthy, and the great
distance from the "back Settlement" to New Bern would
inconvenience "the poor Inhabitants of those parts".

It

was because of these problems, they believed, "that the
address was carried in the Assembly but by a small Majority,
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and in the Council but by the Casting Votes of the President
only, Whereas in a matter of such consequence there ought to
have been if not a unanimous consent at least a large
Majority of both Houses11. Thus they advised the crown to
"pay no regard to this address".47
Whether or not influenced by the council members'
advice, the crown did just that.

The December address, like

its April counterpart, achieved no success.

According to

Davis, the assembly's agent in London informed the
petitioners that the request had been "cooly re-delivered
to him" because it "blended with Matter of a different
Nature, which was unprecedented, and therefore could not be
presented to his Majesty".

Another petition would have to

be sent.48
James Davis lamented this delay, asserting that it was
not for the public good.

Davis did not believe the offered

explanation that the "Matter of a different Nature"
involved in the petition refusal was simply the assembly's
failure to congratulate the king in recent military
victories.

"And can it be supposed," he asked, "that the

BEST of Kings would Refute to Settle perhaps one of the most
distressed of his Provinces, only because their Address to
him for that Purpose sat out with congratulating him on the
Success of the War?"

He feared that North Carolina had not

been given "FAIR PLAY" in the delay, which was "incongruous
to Justice, and baneful to Liberty".

Furthermore, the
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delay allowed a vacancy in the council, caused by the death
of a supporter of the address, to be filled by a Cape Fear
m a n .49
Governor Dobbs 1s resistance was perhaps also
influential in the petition's failure.

Asked by the

assembly to recommend New Bern to the crown, Dobbs wrote to
the Board of Trade in February 1763, that he "could not
recommend it as a healthy situation, having been thrice at
death's door from its low-stagnated situation & bad water, .
and as to its being most central, that depends upon the
manner of His Majesty's fixing the Boundary Line upon St
Augustine & Florida's being added to His Majesty's
Acquisitions".50 Evidently Dobbs, and his supporters in the
Council, were unrealistically hoping that a revision of
North Carolina's southern border would make the Cape Fear
region more acceptable as a capital site.
Dobbs's poor health brought the capital dispute to a
governmental crisis during 1763.

A serious illness early

that year temporarily cost Dobbs the use of his legs and he
considered returning to England.

The governor had only

partially recovered by spring and persisted in holding
assembly meetings at Wilmington.

In December, northern

members refused to travel to Cape Fear; the members who did
meet, though constituting a quorum, refused to conduct any
business in the absence of so many of their peers.

Dobbs

eventually allowed the members to dissolve themselves and
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then called for new elections.

In his sympathetic

portrayal of the governor, Desmond Clarke conceded that
Dobbs *s action was perhaps "harsh and arbitrary", yet
states that "it is difficult to see what else he could have
done under the circumstances".51
Representing the Society for Propogating the Gospel in
North Carolina, James Reed described the political chaos in
a December 2 6 letter:
[Y]esterday I received information that on
the 2 0th there was not a sufficient number
of members then arrived to make a house &
that it was the current opinion there would
be no session of Assembly this winter,
Wilmington is not at all central, but a
remote part of the Province, where 'tis
quite inconvenient for the majority of the
assembly-men to attend & our Govr is too
infirm to meet them at any other place. In
short the Province is in great confusion
for want of the seat of government being
fixed & the approaching dissolution of the
Governor, presents us with a gloomy
prospect, upon his decease I expect that
old quarrels will be renewed[, ] old
grievances repeated & the whole Province
disunited & divided into the old Parties of
North & South . . . .52
Dobbs was indeed rekindling the old sectional split, and in
early 1764 succeeded in getting several of his desired
bills passed in the absence of northern representatives.53
The unsettled and threatening political scene of August
1764 spurred James Davis to write his essay on North
Carolina*s capital.

He concluded his article by begging

representatives to attend the October assembly in
Wilmington, "or perhaps while we are pleasing ourselves
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with these Golden Scenes, the Great Fiat may be passed, and
the Door shut against you; the Seat of Government may be
Settled at Wilmington, and then, too late, we may behold the
wretched State of the Province” . Davis was extreme in
stirring up the representatives' discontent:
And now my Countrymen, what would Some of
you give, to have the Seat of Government
again at Newbern? To have it in the Centre
of the Province, where seldom an Assembly
was held, but every Member that possibly
could, gave his Attendance; and where
there never was Occasion to Prorogue and
Dissolve, to Dissolve and Prorogue again,
before an Assembly could be got? Methinks
I hear some of you break out, "O Newbern,
Newbern! When shall I again tread thy
Grassy Plains, and shake the Wilmingtonian
Dust from my Feet! When again shall I
breathe that Air, and drink of that Water,
which I was once induced to believe were
'replete with pestiferous Animalculae!
But enough! 'tis done; and I am doomed to
give my Attendance in a sandy
Desart. . . ."54
Davis' attack on Wilmington gave evidence of a
development which helped control the sectional crisis of
1763-1764.

The southern faction in 1746 had been composed

of both Cape Fear and Neuse interests, but was now split by
a New Bern/Wilmington rivalry— New Bern interests becoming
"increasingly resentful over Wilmington's threatened
dominance as the colony's capital".55 Ekirch emphasized
that Dobbs's impending departure also helped to restrain
conflict.

In 1764, the crown appointed William Tryon as

lieutenant governor in anticipation of Dobbs's retirement
in March 1765.

Leading provincials quieted their conflicts
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To James Davis, at least, Tryon's appointment as
lieutenant governor gave hope to a settlement of the
capital dispute:
And are THESE TIMES to continue? No, my
Countrymen! His Majesty our most Gracious
Sovereign, has said No: A King whose Ear
is naturally tun'd to the charming Voice of
LIBERTY? a King who has declared from the
Throne the tender Concern he feels for All
his People, has said No. Our Grievances
have SOME HOW OR OTHER reached his Royal
Ear, and he has been graciously pleased to
appoint us a New Governor? under whose
Administration we have the Blessed Hope of
seeing the Settlement of the Country? of
seeing, that a Gentleman who may
reasonably be supposed divested of all
Manner of Prejudice or Partiality in
Favour of this or that Party, will settle
in the Centre of the Country, and call the
Assemblies to a P L A C E where they will
meet him with Cheerfulness and Alacrity.57
Davis was undoubtedly confident that "the Centre of the
Country" would prove to be his precious New Bern.
Tryon's administration would indeed, to a New Bernian's
view, set things aright.

After a decade of gubernatorial

attempts to move the capital away from New Bern, Governor
Tryon would with little hesitation establish New Bern as
capital.
enough.

Davis, however, was perhaps not far-sighted
With the rise of Tryon, he perceived the rise of

New Bern? but beyond that he failed to see that approaching
revolution would again upset the capital site.

Still,

after decades of uncertainty, North Carolina would have a
colonial capital.
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CHAPTER IV

RESOLUTION AND REVOLUTION
THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, 17 64-17 87
"We hear from Cape Fear", James Davis announced in his
North-Carolina Magazine on August 10, 1764, "that a
Lieutenant Governor of the Province is appointed at Home
one Col. Tryan, an Officer in the Guards; and that he is
expected out immediately.

'Tis also said, that his

Excellency the Governor goes home in March next".1 Governor
Arthur Dobbs's impending departure and William Tryon's
appointment as lieutenant governor helped calm the
political agitation which had been festering in North
Carolina.

A. Roger Ekirch proposes that Dobbs's

anticipated departure— enhanced by his unexpected death in
March 1765— caused provincial leaders to cool their
sectional tempers in hopes of winning the new executive's
favor.2 James Davis directed his newspaper article,
however, toward the specific dispute over North Carolina's
seat of government.

Governor Gabriel Johnston had

successfully dislocated the capital from Edenton after
1736.

Since then varied attempts to establish a capital at

Wilmington, Bath, New Bern, the Trent River, and Tower Hill
had failed.
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Davis hoped that the new lieutenant governor would end
the thirty years of limbo.

As an active and outspoken

resident of New Bern, he also had a definite bias as to
where Tryon should establish the capital.

Davis knew

though that Wilmington had eyes on the new governor as well,
and said so with tongue well in cheek:

"The good People of

Wilmington, ever intent on the Good of the Province, and
always foremost in every Scheme for its Welfare and
internal Quietude, immediately. . . engaged a large House.
. . for the Reception and Accomodation of the Governor on
his Arrival. . . upon a Certainty that he will settle among
them there."3 Such Wilmingtonian hopes were probably fired
by New Bern's failure to keep Governor Dobbs.
Governor Dobbs's removal of public business to
Wilmington had been a blow to the commercial life of James
Davis's town, but New Bern was not guiltless in its
misfortune.4 John Campbell of Bertie County wrote to a New
Bern resident during that sad time:
The account of the dullness of your Town &
buissness in it I am sorry for[,] but the
unthinking People in and about it must
thank themsels who drove away the Govr &
Officers. These People could not bear a
little flow of money, but Grew So Proud &
Insolent they will feel the reverse and now
may reflect on themselves when too
Late. . . .5
The commercial interests of New Bern had not only failed to
provide adequate housing for the governor but also charged
unusually high prices for needed goods.

Likewise, in 17 64,
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James Davis lamented with "Terrible Horribility!" the high
prices then being charged in Wilmington, where Dobbs had
moved many government offices.6
By the time Tryon arrived, however, New Bern had learned
its lesson.

Davis proudly stated his town's case:

But the People of Newbern, having for their
Disobediance, drank largely of the Cup of
Affliction and entirely depending on the
Goodness of their Cause, have engaged a
large genteel House. . . for the Governor's
Residence; upon a Supposition he will
settle rather in the Centre of the
Province, than at Cape-Fear, a Place
within Fifty Miles of the South Boundary of
a Province almost 3 00 Miles wide, and the
Passage to it gloomy and dismal, through
hot parching Sands, enliven'd now and then
by Wire Grass Ridges and Ponds of stagnant
Water.7
The New Bernians made a residence available to the new
governor for only four pence per year.8
Tryon's choice certainly was not limited to these two
competing towns.

He might well have chosen a more western

location, nearer the populous back country; in fact, some
historians insist the the eastern regions united behind the
choice of New Bern in fear that Tryon would name
Hillsborough as the capital (see Map 2) .9 Such a fear may
have existed, and the eventual assembly approval of Tryon's
Palace in New Bern showed some degree of cooperation
between eastern assemblymen, but such cooperation should
not be overstated.

The growing competition, economic as

well as political, between New Bern and Wilmington hindered
their co-operation on the capital issue.

Davis's depiction
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of the Wilmingtonians, though far from objective, reflected
the disagreement between the leaders of the two towns as to
the choice of a capital.

As late as 1774, the future

governor Samuel Johnston, in writing to representative
Alexander Elmsly concerning conflict with "the Southern
Gentlemen," asserted "the Cape Fear people can hardly find
in their hearts to forgive you for fixing the Governor's
10
House at New Bern".
New Bern's fear that either Wilmington or Hillsborough
would be chosen as the capital proved groundless.

Even

before Tryon officially became governor, he favored New
Bern as the future capital.
England:

He wrote to Lord Adam Gordon in

"If the Seat of Government Should ever happen to

be established there [New Bern] , as it probably may, from
its being nearly Central, it will become a place of Note
very soon, and will outvie any other Town in North
Carolina".11 After a two-month tour of the province, Tryon
became confirmed in his conviction that the "Publick
Business" of North Carolina could "be carried on nowhere
with so much conveniency and advantage to far the greatest
part of the Inhabitants, as at New Bern".12 Joseph A. Ernst
and H. Roy Merrens perceive specific commercial motives for
Tryon's choice of New Bern, the location of the capital
having primary significance within the context of a broad
campaign for North Carolina's economic growth.

In their

study of urban development, Ernst and Merrens describe both
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the location of the capital at New Bern and the erection of
an expensive governor's palace as directed by a similar
objective:

"to provide not only for the easier

administration of the colony but also for the creation of a
great port city and marketplace in the central port of the
province in the continuing drive to offset the economic
advantages of Charleston.1,13 Such an interpretaion has
merit, especially considering Tryon's view of New Bern as
"nearly Central."

The governor's conception of New Bern's

centrality gave evidence of his failure to duly consider
the growing back settlements— a neglect which led him to
misjudge the town's centrality, its potential for growth,
and popular support of his palace.

A royal governor such as

Tryon, however, would naturally have an eastern bias in
considering geographical centrality: for him, easy access
j
to the Atlantic, and thus to London, would outvie other
considerations in choosing a capital site.
Whether or not Tryon knew upon his arrival that New Bern
would be his choice for the seat of government, he certainly
had plans for an elaborate capitol and governor's mansion.
John Hawks, a master architect, accompanied Tryon to North
Carolina, for the new governor "esteemed it very material
for the credit and interest of this province that the
governor should have a fixed and commodious place of
residence for doing publick business."14 The majority of
the lower house of assembly agreed with Tryon, and in
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December 17 66 passed an act for the construction of a
governor's mansion in New Bern funded by 5,000
Carolina currency.
appropriated 10,000

in North

In January 17 68 the lower house
more for the construction of what

became known as "Tryon's Palace."15 Plans for an official
governor's residence resolved the quandary over the
colony's seat of government, for even though the assembly
made no specific mention of New Bern as capital, the palace
was to serve the dual purpose of governor's residence and
assembly house.

The assembly assumed the capital issue to

be settled in 1766, for experience had shown the great
influence which gubernatorial residence had over the
location of provincial government.
Another issue, perhaps not totally unrelated to that of
the capital, which marked Tryon's first year as governor
was North Carolina's reaction to the Stamp Act.

Opposition

to the tax first became evident in early May 1765.

By the

fall, demonstrations had occurred in Cross Creek, Edenton,
New Bern, and Wilmington.

Although Wilmington's first

demonstration did not take place until October 19, the
Lower Cape Fear experienced the most widespread and violent
of the colony's stamp tax protests.16 Several explanations
exist for this concentration of protest in the Lower Cape
Fear region.

Brunswick, just downriver from Wilmington,

served as the province's principal port, so the region
would naturally feel the greatest effect of the proposed
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tax.

Both the stamp master's residence in Brunswick and

Tryon's temporary residence there both influenced the
degree of protest in the Wilmington area.

Ekirch proposes

another influence on relative degrees of protest in North
Carolina.

Although he emphasizes that the act was

unpopular throughout the colony, Ekirch states that
inhabitants of more northern towns "may have moderated
their tempers because of Tryon's decision to fix the
capital in New Bern, much to their delight and the anger of
Cape Fear residents."17 If correct, this analysis gives
impetus to the possibility that Tryon's efforts at
temporary compromise— living in Brunswick while holding
assemblies at New Bern— did not satisfactorily assuage the
Wilmingtonians.

Cape Fear interests sensed that, in this

instance, current gubernatorial residence would not alter
Tryon's choice of New Bern as the capital site.
The actual construction of Tryon's residence in New Bern
proved unpopular with segments of the populous piedmont
area.

The Regulators, who initially organized in Orange

County in 1766 and whose influence later spread into
surrounding areas, protested many aspects of perceived
governmental corruption, mainly on the local level.

The

Regulators were frustrated at the monopoly of non-native
lawyers and merchants in local government positions, and
these new elites' lucrative use of exhorbitant fees, which
often hit the western farmers hard.

10

,

,

The costs of building
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John Hawks1s two-story brick palace with curved colonnades
and outlying wings greatly exceeded provincial funds and
was placed directly on the people through a poll tax and a
tax on alcoholic beverages.

The Regulators protested such

taxation when not "' one man in twenty of the four most
populous counties [Orange, Rowan, Mecklenburg, and Anson]
will ever see this famous house when built (as their
connections and trade do, and ever will more naturally
center in South Carolina) 111.19 Ekirch asserts that the
Regulators not only resented to cost of the building, but
also saw it symbolic of the corruption which they
increasingly viewed as widespread and "as evidence of
courtly intrigue involving Tryon himself." 20 It is
•

•

•

•

•

•

important to remember, in the context of North Carolinafs
long struggle over the capital's location, that the
Regulators did not protest the choice of New Bern as the
seat of government.

There may have been some resentment

over such an eastern capital, but it was not voiced.

After

all, in the Regulators' eyes, New Bern was a better site
than Wilmington, and Hillsborough simply had not been in
the running for capital to the degree it would be by the
1780's.

Rather, the Regulators protested paying for what

they considered an unnecessarily expensive building
located far from their homes.
Despite western protest, the palace was completed in
177 0 and Governor Tryon moved from Brunswick to New Bern in
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early June.21 Almost a year later, militiamen led by Tryon
defeated the Regulators at the Battle of Alamance.
Military defeat did not greatly reduce backcountry
resentment against the governor's palace; neither did the
\

location of the capital— so long hotly disputed— suddenly
become a benign issue.

In September 1771 a subscriber to

the Virginia Gazette, calling himself "Phocion", felt it
necessary to defend both the legitimacy of the capital and
Tryon's impartiality:
The Design of building a Palace for
the Governor was schemed by some Gentleman
of the Assembly, who proposed by this
Means, to fix the Seat of Government in a
Town convenient for the whole Province; as
many Members were often greatly
incommoded, by the Necessity [of going]
from one extreme Part of the Province to
another. This I am authoritatively
assured, was the original Cause of the
Erection of the Palace; and I assert it was
formed by Gentlemen who were not
officially dependent on the Governour, and
were not, many of them, personal Friends to
him. . . .22
Phocion may not have realized that Tryon arrived in North
Carolina with architect in hand.

In writing about the

palace to the Earl of Shelburne, Tryon confided that John
Hawks "came with me out of England to superintend this work
in all its branches".23 Phocion, however, was correct in
implying that the governor could not have succeeded in his
plans for an official seat of government or governor's
residence without the assembly's cooperation.

Regardless

of the governor's motives, resentment of the capital would
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die hard for some, as evidenced again by Samuel Johnston's
words of 1774, "the Cape Fear people can hardly find in
their hearts to forgive you for gixing the Governor's House
at New Bern" .24
As of 1765, North Carolina finally had a permanent seat
of government— the first official one since Edenton of the
17 3 0's— and even had a permanent building for the
legislature as of 1770.

With the outbreak of the Revolution

and the growing population of the western areas, however,
the new state legislatures would succeed in stripping New
Bern of its status as a capital in much the same way Gabriel
Johnston maneuvered the government away from Edenton.
Important differences did exist between the two
dislocations— differences partly caused by the meaning of
the Revolution and partly by new sectional tensions.
In 1771, a victorious Governor Tryon was grateful to be
replaced by Josiah Martin.

Martin, a strong supporter of

royal prerogative, would soon face the crisis of a greater
rebellion than his predecessor had encountered.

At first

the Revolution portended no threat to New Bern's status as
capital.

When in 1774 Martin refused to summon the

legislature in time to elect delegates to the First
Continental Congress, the resulting Provincial Congress
met at New Bern, to choose delegates and establish a non
importation policy in reaction to the Tea Act of 1773.

In

April 1775 the assembly and the Second Provincial Congress-
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-almost identical in memberships— both met in New Bern a
day apart.

Governor Martin dissolved this last fruitless

assembly on 8 April.

By 31 May he had taken refuge on a

British man-of-war upon the threat of an attack by the
Wilmington and New Hanover committees of safety.25 Royal
government in North Carolina had collapsed.
The first hint of New Bern's fate came in August 1775,
when the third Provincial Congress met at Hillsborough.
The Hillsborough Provincial Congress— the first body
claiming authority for North Carolina to meet outside of
New Bern since 1765— set up a provisional government and
made plans for war.

The following three state legislatures

did meet in New Bern, but in August 1778 the legislature met
in Hillsborough, unknowingly inaugurating a new period of
itinerant government that would last until 1794, when the
assembly would meet in the new capital of Raleigh.

During

the interim, the government would visit not only
Hillsborough and New Bern, but also Halifax, Smithfield,
Wake County, and Tarboro.

The itineracy of Governor

Gabriel Johnston's day had developed due to the growing
population of the Cape Fear region— a region in which
Johnston, the man who called the assembly meetings, claimed
residency.

In the 1770's, the growing population of the

western counties, which were continually playing "catch
up" in assembly representation, gradually came to have a
greater voice in legislature.

After 1775, the legislature

itself could determine where it would meet, so demand for
sites more central than New Bern grew until the old capital
city yielded to Hillsboro, Halifax, and Smithfield.
Without a royal governor to name the place to meet, however,
itinerant government under Governor Richard Caswell and his
successors took on a new dimnension of instability as the
assemblymen debated locations.

The debates caused

problems, for example, the standoff between Fayetteville
and New Bern in 1790.26

Debates on meeting places also

resulted in the lack of a quorum when western legislators
won meetings as far west as Salem.27
Influences other than westerly growth also affected New
Bern's status as the seat of government and the state's new
era of governmental itineracy.

A 1779 smallpox epidemic

prevented the scheduled spring general assembly session
from meeting in New Bern.

Governor Richard Caswell,

powerless to call the assembly "to any other place than that
to which the same stood adjourned," requested that the body
meet at Johnston Court House (later Smithfield) .

The

governor's correspondence that year stressed a military
threat to New Bern and eastern North Carolina which helped
diminish the town's usefulness as a governmental center.
In explaining why North Carolina militia would probably not
be sent south, Caswell described the situtation in May:
I think you need not look for any more Militia
from this State, as the enemy, about 3,000, have
actually invaded Virginia, taken possession of the
Fort at Portsmouth, burnt Suffolk, and threaten
Edenton, New Bern and Wilmington, with every other
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part of the State to which they can get access, with
destruction and desolation, which seems in some
measure probable, as they have three or four Row
Galleys, calculated to go up our Sounds by their
small draft of water.29
In considering this threat, Caswell commanded the public
provisions at New Bern, "insecure from the ravages of the
enemy," to be moved inland.30 If public provisions needed to
be moved upriver, state government would likely be safer
there, too.

Smallpox and the military threat worked

together to make New Bern an unattractive place for
assembly meetings.

Colonel Sam Jarvis wrote to the

governor from New Bern in June 1779:

"Your Excellency will

please Excuse Bad writing, as I am much alarmed at the
disorder in town."31
New Bern's dislocation as capital was achieved through
renewed governmental itineracy, fed by the capital's health
problems and military threat.

Official sanction of this

dislocation, however, needed the establishment of a state
capital.

During and after the Revolution, the debates over

temporary meeting places for the assembly paled in
comparison to the struggle for a permanent capital.

The

struggle officially began on 6 December, 1777, when a bill
"for fixing the seat of Government in this State and for
appointing and impowering Commissioners for purchasing
lots of land where to erect the public buildings necessary
for that purpose" was presented in the senate.32 The bill
did not stipulate where this new capital might be located
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and was quickly defeated in the house of commons.33
In February 1779 the struggle resumed, as a
representative in the house of commons introduced a bill
"to Establish the seat of Government. . .for erecting public
buildings and providing proper offices for the public
officers." Although the bill passed in both houses upon its
first reading, it was then rejected in the house of
commons.34

The February debate reappeared in May, when

house and senate concurred in appointing a commission to
look for a capital site.

The senate speaker explained this

rejection of itineracy and the call for a permanent
capital:
Whereas, the holding the General Assembly of
this State, and the Offices incident thereto, at some
certain fixed place, at or near the centre thereof,
would save a considerable Expense to the public and
tend much to the Ease and advantage of the
Inhabitants in other Respects as well as for the
preservation of the public Records,
Resolved, therefore, that two Commissioners
from each District be appointed by the Present
Assembly. . .
And that a majority of them view and fix upon
some place in each of the Counties of Johnston, Wake &
Chatham, for holding the General Assembly, the most
commodious, convenient and agreeable to the persons
who may be drawn thither by attending on the public
Business, and that they return a fair plan of each
place with a Description of the natural advantages
and report the same to the next Assembly.35
Whereas the February capital bill had no geographical
stipulation, the May debate revolved around a site choice
for a permanent capital, convenient to the citizens of
North Carolina and with good natural endowments, echoing
the desires of colonial assemblymen, royal governors, and
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Lords Proprietors.

In 1779, however, "at or near the

centre" meant not only a balance of north and south, but
also a recognition of the growing west? and so, the
advocates of this bill restricted the capital site to the
counties of Johnston, Wake, and Chatham.

While an eastern

bias may still be seen in this concept of centrality, the
bill proposed a relatively judicious central location
compared to Tryon* s view of New Bern as "being nearly
Central."36 Still, the geographical designation provoked
debate in the senate.

Thomas Respass, Jr., of Beaufort

County "moved that the Words 'or any other place' be added"
after the designation of the three counties.37 The senate
rejected this proposal in a close vote— fifteen to twelve.
The commissioners to choose a site were scheduled to meet
"on or about" 25 September at Wake County Courthouse,
receiving five pounds per diem for their services, and to
,

t

,

report their decision to the October assembly.
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Two points should be made about the assembly's May
action.

First, the assembly neither bound itself to the

commissioners' site choice nor to the act of establishing a
permanent capital— it only appointed commissioners to
choose a capital site.

The non-commital nature of this bill

would become obvious in the assembly's actions of October
1779.

Secondly, a hint of sectionalism appeared in the vote

(see Map 3) . With the exception of Rowan, Franklin, and
Pitt Counties, eastern representatives tended to approve of
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?IAP 3

defeated

this

measure

fifteen

to

twelve.

the Words 'in the Counties of Johnston, Wake & Chatham'" (SR 13:
geographically identifiable.
Twenty counties did not participate
senate

733).
All votes were
in this vote.
The
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expanding the capital site search area, while the more
western regions tended to reject the removal of
geographical limitation.39 With only 27 of the 47 counties
voting, however, any geographic interpretation would be
inconclusive.

The geographical implications of the capital

issue, however, would become strikingly obvious in the fall
assembly.
When the assembly met that October, Benjamin Seawell,
senator from Franklin County, presented a bill "to
establish the Seat of Government" that proved the May
actions far from conclusive.40

The house of commons

defeated this new bill by two votes.

The requested role-

call vote demonstrated that the issue of establishing a
permanent capital divided the counties along distinct
geographical lines (see Map 4) . The counties voting
against the bill were all in the eastern part of the state.
Those voting for the establishment of a capital— with the
exceptions of Currituck and Bladen— lay further inland.41
North Carolina's long tradition of itinerent government
may have been influential in the eastern counties 1
resistance to establishing a new state capital in 1779.
Itinirent government may have seemed somewhat normal to
established easterners whose only experience with a
permanent capital occurred in the decade after 1765.

New

settlers to the back settlements, many migrating from
colonies to the north, may have been anxious about such
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governmental flux.

Also, the military threat to eastern

North Carolina made eastern capital sites unnatractive, and
perphaps caused eastern representatives to be cautious
about establishing the seat of government just yet.

Such

theories make Bladen and Currituck's votes especially
intriguing.

Were they both exceptions, or did Bladen

perhaps represent the geographical front of an ideological
trend?

Fortunately, much more significant role call votes

occurred later which would give clearer pictures of
sectionalism

in the capital issue.

Between the capital bill's defeat in October 1779 and
the passage of a similar bill in the spring of 1782, much
could have happened toward the establishment of a seat of
government.

Lefler and Powell claim that:

[i]n 1781, Hillsborough was chosen as
the site, but there was much opposition to
this decision, especially after Governor
Thomas Burke was taken prisoner by the
Tories of that town. In a political trade
by which Alexander Martin was elected
governor, the law was repealed in
1782. . . .42
Had an act establishing Hillsborough as capital been
repealed in such a political trade, the political dealing
would hearken back to the use of the capital issue in the
administrations of Johnston and Dobbs.

Unfortunately, the

State Records of North Carolina are silent as to any such
legislation in 1781 or repeal in 1782.
Hillsboro:

Francis Nash, in

Colonial and Revolutionary, makes no mention of

the town being chosen as a capital site in 1781 or of the
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repeal of any such act.43 Likewise, Hugh F. Rankin, in his
article on "Orange County in the Era of the American
Revolution" makes no mention of such actions.44
Although direct evidence for Lefler and Powell's
propositions cannot be presented here, the context of North
Carolina's situation in 1781 can be examined.

New Bern was

still considered insecure in the face of the British
threat.

Military and administrative correspondance during

1781 demonstrates the North Carolina's leaders considered
inland areas generally more secure than coastal regions.45
This situation would serve a cozy context to Lefler and
Powell's claim that the inland site of Hillsborough was
made a capital during that year.

Hillsborough, however,

had problems of its own which made it an unnattractive
choice.

The correspondance of General Sumner demonstrates

that rumors existed of an enemy presence in the town.

"The

Enemy's van guard," he wrote in February, " is in
Hillsborough."46
Not everyone shared his concern, however? in that same
month another military officer wrote that the "News
Consarning the British at Hilsboro I am perswaided is
false."47 Yet in April Sumner wrote of the "distressed
condition" of Hillsborough and in May mentioned that
smallpox was raging in the town.48 Hillsborough was not a
prime capital site in 1781 even if it lay inland.

In all

fairness, however, Lefler and Powell did state that the act

97 .

choosing the town as a seat of government was unpopular.
The second part of Lefler and Powell*s proposition— that
in 1782 the assembly repealed legislation which named
Hillsborough the seat of government— is more problematic.
In 1782 the legislature concerned itself with passing— not
repealing— a capital measure.

On 25 April 1782 the house

and senate appointed a joint committee "to prepare and
bring in a bill for appointing a place at which the General
Assembly hereafter shall be held."49 Abner Nash,
representative from Jones County, introduced the "Bill for
appointing a place for the future meetings of the General
Assembly" in the house of commons, and both houses had
passed the bill the necessary three times by 8 May 1782.50
The assembly passed rather than repealed an act to
establish the seat of government in 1782.
Hillsborough did play a prominent role in the 1782
assembly, but not in the manner which Lefler and Powell have
suggested.

Rather than repealing Hillsborough as a capital

site, the assembly voted to hold the next assembly session
at that town, and even "enacted that the further General
Assemblies shall be continued there until a proper place
shall be chosen for a Seat of Government."51 Not yet ready
to agree on a permanent capital site, the assembly desired
to at least end the inconveniences of itinerent government
by appointing Hillsborough as an official temporary site.
That same year the assembly legislated to repair
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Hillsborough's public buildings, finding the immediate
renovation "necessary for the conveniency of transacting
public business."52 In 1782, Hillsborough's "public
business"

was not seen as merely local.

The act naming Hillsborough as a temporary meeting site
is significant, for in it the assembly verbalized special
concerns of the capital issue in a state at war.

The "Act

for appointing a place for the Future Meetings of the
General Assembly" stipulated:
I. Whereas it is found by experience that
great and manifest inconveniences have
arisen to the public, and are daily
increasing for want of having a proper
place fixed on for holding the General
Assembly ?
II. Be it therefore Enacted by the General
Assembly of the State of North
Carolina. . . That from and after the
present session of Assembly, and until a
proper place shall be fixed on for a seat
of government by legislative authority,
the future General Assemblies of this
State shall be held at the town of
Hillsborough.53
The act added that should the assembly "have good cause to
apprehend their session is in danger of being interrupted
by the enemy, they may adjourn to any other place of greater
safety."54 Remembering not only enemy threat but also
smallpox epidemics, the act gave the governor authority,
under advice of council, to convene the assembly "to such
other place as he shall judge most proper and convenient"
should Hillsborough "by chance of war fall into hands of the
enemy, or be in imminent danger of falling into their hands,
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or in case any contagious disease should prevail in such a
place at the time appointed for the meeting of the General
Assembly."55
Whether or not Hillsborough was ever designated the
official seat of government, Lefler and Powell, in claiming
such an act was repealed within a year, hit upon a basic
fact of North Carolina's capital issue.

Until Raleigh was

established in the 1790's, no capital decision ever lasted
very long— except perhaps the passive decision for
inaction.

Hillsborough's position as a temporary meeting

place lasted only until 1784, when the assembly voted to
convene in New Bern.

Even as early as May 1783 other towns

had been considered for assembly meeting sites.

The act for

appointing a permanent capital site, passed in May 1782,
had just as short a lifespan.

By 10 May 178 3 "a bill for

repealing an act entitled an act for appointing a place for
the future meetings of the General Assembly" became law.56
The repeal passed its final vote in the house of commons by
only one representative.57 A comparison of this role-call
vote for repeal to the house vote which passed the 1782 act
demonstrates a sectional firming in the capital issue (see
Maps 5 and 6) .58 In 1782, an east-west antagonism surfaced
in the vote, though many exceptions to this trend appeared
among the eastern representatives.

Bertie, Chowan, and

Jones Counties voted yea while many of their eastern
neighbors opposed the bill.

Unfortunately,

eleven of the
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MAP 6
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eastern counties did not vote or had unidentifiable votes,
thus minimizing the significance of any geographical trend.
The inablity to determine how Brunswick, New Hanover, and
Bladen Counties would have voted precludes any indication
of how Cape Fear interests stood on the issue.
All votes are identified in the 1783 repeal vote and
demonstrate a strengthened sectional trend.

Only four

eastern counties failed to vote, and those that did— with
the exception of Bladen— voted for repeal.

Northampton,

Halifax, and Nash Counties had conflicting votes from their
representatives, but they were on the border of the
emerging sectional blocks.

Bertie, Chowan, and Jones fell

in line with their eastern neighbors, but, surprisingly, so
did Wake and Johnston.59 Perhaps the representatives of
these two counties— counties which had been considered as
capital sites in 1779— sided with their eastern colleagues
in hopes of postponing any decision on the capital until
Hillsboro no longer seemed a probable choice.
Comparing these two votes to Maps 3 and 4 suggests some
conclusions as to the counties' roles in the surfacing
sectionalism.

Bladen County, though close to the coast,

consistently voted with the more western counties.

Its

neighbors, New Hanover and Duplin, however, consistently
voted with the eastern counties, thus drawing the
southeastern sectional line close to the coast.

The

comparison also indicates that Wake's alliance with the
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east in 178 3 was perhaps just an aberration.

The counties

which showed a trend of inconsistency— Johnston, Nash,
Franklin, Halifax— demonstrate that the edge of
sectionalism was unclear north of Duplin County.
A danger exists in viewing the outcome of capital bills
in North Carolina as clear demonstrations of the popularity
of establishing a seat of government.

The recurrent

questions and close votes prove the capital issue to be an
ongoing debate.

Former governor Richard Caswell wrote to

his son William in May 1783 about the "Bill to repeal the
Hillsboro1 Act for fixing the Seat of Government."60 What he
called the "Hillsboro1 Act" was not the act establishing
that town as a temporary meeting site, but the act
establishing a permanent seat of government— passed at
Hillsborough— without regard to a specific site.

In his

letter, Caswell strikingly added:
& tomorrow 1tis said a Bill will be
introduced for Building Public offices &
directing public officers to reside there,
this is to fix the seat of Government when
the Buildings are erected. Wake & X Creek
are talked of. X Creek & Newbern will be in
dispute for the next meeting of Assembly.61
While the assembly repealed an act establishing the seat of
government, forces in the assembly for establishing a
capital were very much in play.

No new action toward a

capital passed again, however, until 1788.
Despite lack of definitive action in 1784, the capital
issue attracted much debate.

Richard Caswell wrote in
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April 1784 that there was "Much talk about the seat of
Government, I believe if its Attempted Fayetteville,
Tarboro & this place [Hillsborough] will be in
nomination.1,62 In May he wrote to his son that
New modes of Courts, Court Laws & Judges
are much talked of as well as fixing the
Seat of Government. Tarboro' &
Fayetteville seem, at present, to have the
advantage & will be opposed to each other.63
Later that month, the senate proposed that "the General
Assembly ballot immediately for the place where the seat of
Government shall be fixed."64 The senate nominated Tarboro,
Fayetteville, Smithfield, and "the plantation of Mr. John
Abernathie in Wake County" as possible capital sites.65 The
house agreed to ballot for a site choice, but none of the
places nominated won a majority in both houses, so the
assembly postponed the capital issue "until a later day."66
Richard Caswell described this situation to his son,
William.

After writing of the close contest between

Hillsborough and New Bern for the next assembly site (New
Bern was to win) , he then explained:
much has been done towards fixing the Seat
of Government but a few Neuse Men have
hitherto put a Stop to it. Tarboro was
within three of a Majority one in three
Times Voting. Fayetteville was in
Competition. We had for Smithfield in the
Course of the Three times polling 18, 13 &
17 which effectually has yet stopped their
farther progress, Indeed I do not know if
it will be again attempted.67
Caswell blamed "a few Neuse Men" for the general assembly's
failure to establish a capital.

On one level his remark was
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too simplistic:

other areas besides the Neuse River region

voted against capital bills.

Why Caswell had this

perception, however, deserves explanation.
men?

Who were Neuse

The counties actually touched by the Neuse River were

Carteret, Craven, Dobbs, Wayne, Johnston, Wake, and— at the
river's source— Orange.

Neuse tributaries touched Jones,

Pitt, Edgecombe, Nash, and Franklin Counties.

In the three

role-call votes on whether or not to establish a capital
(Maps 4-6), Johnston, Wake, Orange, Jones, and Nash
Counties were not consistently allied with other eastern
counties in opposition to capital measures.

In the house

vote of 10 May 1783, however, the counties touching the
Neuse— with the exception of Orange— all joined to favor
repeal of the capital act.

Of the total Neuse River system,

only Nash, Franklin, and Orange Counties opposed repeal.
Perhaps a coalition of Neuse representatives were the
driving force in the push for repeal, and perhaps in 1784 —
even more speculative, as there was no role-call vote—
Neuse men worked against a majority vote in balloting for a
capital site.

Sites within the Neuse region, however, were

nominated for the balloting.

Caswell may have meant that

Neuse men defeated any majority decision by competing among
themselves and with others.
A role-call vote on the capital issue does exist for
December 1785, over a year after Caswell's comment on the
"Neuse men."

The house of commons rejected a "Bill for
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MAP 7

MAP 7:
House of commons vote of 16 December 1785 on whether "a Bill for keeping the
principal offices of State in the Town of Hillsborough" should pass (SR 17:
354-355).
All of the votes were geographically identifiable.
Nine counties did not participate
in this vote.
The house defeated this bill forty-one to thirty-seven.
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keeping the principal offices of State in the Town of
Hillsborough" upon its first reading by a close vote (41 to
zo

37) .

,

A geographical analysis of this vote (see Map 7)

shows many exceptions to the sectional trend that had
developed.

While Currituck County voted opposite its

eastern neighbors, Davidson and Surry cast votes opposing
the Hillsborough seat of government.

More significant

developments occurred in the southern half of the state.
While Bladen and New Hanover stood with their previous
positions of siding with west and east respectively, the
other counties of the Cape Fear Valley demonstrated mixed
views on the bill.

Most striking were the votes of Duplin

and Sampson in support of the bill, for the parent county of
Duplin had consistently sided with the eastern counties in
the past.

Z
Q

Through the 1785 vote significance can be seen

in Richard C a s w e l l s label "Neuse men".

He chose a major

river for his label— a river economically rivaled by the
Cape Fear River to the south.

The counties of the Cape Fear

system (Brunswick, New Hanover, Bladen, Duplin, Sampson,
Cumberland, Moore, Chatham, Randolph, Orange, and
Guilford), taken together, began showing flux on the
capital issue while counties in the northeast had become
more unified in opposition to the west.
northeast and southeast was formalizing.

A break between
In the last half

of the 1780's, this difference would dramatically gel to
present a state clearly divided on the capital issue along
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the lines of two river systems.
The 1785 vote also demonstrated the beginning of a quite
different trend in the geographical sectionalism of the
capital issue.

For the first time, a far-western county—

Davidson— cast a vote in alliance with the northeastern
sector, opposing state offices at Hillsborough.

This was

no fluke, for votes in the far west continued to conform
with the northeastern faction.

Representatives in these

western counties demonstrated, in a "Petition of the
Inhabitants of the Western Country," special concerns about
the capital issue.

The petition, written in December 1787,

defended the westerners' desire for a separate state
government.

One defense concerned the remoteness of the

North Carolina seat of government (such as it was) :
We earnestly request that an impartial
view of our remoteness might be taken into
consideration. The great inconveniency
attending your seat of Government, and
also the great difficulty in ruling well &
giving protection to so remote a people.
To say nothing of the almost impassable
mountains, which renders it impracticable
for us to furnish ourselves with a bare
load of the necessaries of life, except we
in the first instance travel from one to
two hundred & more miles through some other
State 'ere we can reach your government.70
Debates over such sites as Cross Creek, Tarboro,
Hillsborough, Smithfield, and Wake County did not offer
these western residents much hope of a convenient seat of
government.

It is thus understandable that the far-western

representatives had a more ambivalent view of the capital
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issue than did the representatives east of the mountains.
The year of this western petition— 1787— was again
marked by defeated actions toward establishing a seat of
government.

In January the house of commons rejected a

"Resolve. . . declaring the offices of the Treasurer,
Comptroller and Secretary shall be kept at Hillsborough" on
the grounds of "useless expense."71 A December attempt at
fixing the residence of the officers of Government, & the
place for the meeting of the future General Assemblies" was
"ordered to lie over until the next Assembly."72
North Carolina did not see any more definite action
toward the establishment of a capital until the meeting of
the North Carolina convention at Hillsborough during the
summer of 1788.

The state government had weathered the

Revolution without a seat, and was to continue functioning
without a capital for several more years.

By 1788, enemy

threat was long behind the leaders of this state, yet their
government continued itinerantly, their debates about a
site persisted, and their feet drug on the capital issue as
ever before.

The convention of 1788, however, would show a

significant turn of events in the debate despite firming of
the already-emerging sectional lines.

110

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

1. James Davis, printer, The North-Carolina Magazine; or
Universal Intelligencer for 1764. Vol. 1, No. 10 (August
3-10):
80.
2.

Ekirch, "Poor Carolina” , p. 151.

3.

Davis,

North-Carolina Magazine. Vol.

1, No.

10:

80.

4. See Dill, "New Bern", part 5:
"The Political and
Commercial Rise of New Bern", North Carolina Historical
Review 23 (January 1946):
77-78.
5.

CR 6:

580.

6.

Davis,

North-Carolina Magazine. Vol.

7.

ibid.

8.

Dill, "New Bern", part 5:

I, No.

10:

80.

78.

9. Dill, Trvon and his Palace, p. 78?
Newsome, North Carolina, p. 165; Lefler
Colonial North Carolina, p. 224.

Lefler and
andPowell,

10.
CR 9:
1071?see Ekirch, "Poor Carolina", pp.163164
for Cape Fear opposition to funding of Tryon's
Palace. Ekirch believes this opposition may well indicate
Southerners' continued animosity over the capital's
location at New Bern.
11.William Tryon to Lord Adam
Dill, "New Bern", part 5: 47.
12.

CR 6:

Gordon, 17 65, quoted

in

1320.

13. Joseph A. Ernst and Harry Roy Merrens, "'Camden's
Turrets Pierce the Skies': The Urban Process in the
Southern Colonies during the Eighteenth Century", William
and Marv Quarterly (3rd series) 30 (October 1973):
568.
14.

CR 7:

510; Dill, Trvon and his Palace, p. 28.

15. Ekirch, "Poor Carolina",
North Carolina, pp. 182-184.

p. 2 66?

Lefler and Newsome,

16. Ekirch, "Poor Carolina",
North Carolina, p. 182-184.

p. 266;

Lefler and Newsome,

17.

p. 266?see also Lawrence

Ekirch, "Poor Carolina",

Ill.

Lee, "Days of Defiance: Resistance to the Stamp Act in
the Lower Cape Fear", North Carolina Historical Review 4 3
(1966):
199.
18.
For information on varying interpretations of the
North Carolina Regulators see: Ekirch, "Poor Carolina".
Marvin L. Michael Kay, "The North Carolina Regulators,
1766-1776: A Class Conflict" in A. Young, ed., The
American Revolution. Explorations in the History of
American Radicalism Series (Dekalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1976), pp. 84-103; James P.
Whittenburg, "Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers:
Social
Change and the Origins of the North Carolina Regulation",
William and Marv Quarterly (3rd series) 34 (1977):
215238.
19. Quoted in Lefler and Powell, Colonial North
Carolina. p. 228; see also pp. 224-225.
20.

Ekirch, "Poor Carolina", p. 193.

21.

Ashe, North Carolina 1:

3 55.

22. Virginia Gazette no. 1051 (17 September 1771),
article dated 7 August 1771.
23. William Tryon to the Earl of Shelburne, 31 January,
1767, in the William Tryon Papers, North Carolina State
Archives, Raleigh.
24.

CR 9:

1071.

25. Ekirch, "Poor Carolina", pp. 203-204; Lefler and
Newsome, North Carolina, pp. 189-192.
26. The Wilmington Centinel and General Advertiser vol.
1, no. 3 6 (26 November 1788); The North-Carolina
Chronicle; or Fayetteville Gazette, vol. 2, no. 11 (22
November 1790).
27.
228.

Dill, Trvon and his Palace, pp. 246-247.
SR 14:

66, 77.

29.
14:

Governor Caswell to General John Butler, SR
105.

30.

SR

14:

92.

31.

SR

14:

316.

32.

SR 12:

177-179.

112 .

33.

SR 12:

382.

34.

SR 13:

581, 682-683, 711.

35. SR 13:
752 ; see also SR 13:
804 -805, 809

753, 769, 809; 18 :

36.

Quoted in Dill, "New Bern", part 5:

37.

SR 13:

753.

38 .

SR 13:

753 ;

18:

47.

804-805.

39.
Information on the geographical origins of the votes
735-736, 744, 752-753; 12: 549.
found in SR 13:
40.

SR 13:

860.

41.
966; information on the geographical orgins
SR 13:
of these votes found in SR 13: 784-785, 794, 811, 913914, 923, 941; 12: 860;
19:
380.
42.

Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, p. 244.

43.
Francis Nash, Hillsboro:
Colonial and Revolutionary
(Raleigh:
Edwards & Broughton, Printers, 1903).
44. Hugh F. Rankin, "Orange County in the Era of the
American Revolution", in Hugh Lefler and Paul Wager,
eds., Orange Countv:
1752-1952. pp. 41-67 (Chapel Hill,
N. C.: The Orange Printshop, 1953).
45.

SR

14: 428-429,

495; 15: 435.

46.

General Sumner to Lt. Colonel Ashe, SR 15:

47.
15:

Colonel Thomas Brown to General Lillington, SR
423.

48. General Sumner to General Greene, SR 15:
2449.
49.

SR 16:

50. SR 16:
45-46, 86.

59-60, 63: 19:

34.

68-69, 75, 79, 85, 123, 127;

51.

SR

16: 89-90, 95-96;

52.

SR

24: 461-462.

19: 60-61, 116.

19:

425-426.

433, 448-

113 .

448.

53.

SR 24:

54.

ibid.

55.

ibid.

56.

SR 16:

959? 19:

57.

SR 19:

181, 187, 303-304, 308, 314, 334.

171.

58.
Information on the geographical orgins of the 1782
house votes found in SR 16:
1-3, 29, 39, 74, 127? 12:
784 ; 17:
655, 876? 19:
395, 717.
59.
Information of the geographical orgins of the 1783
house votes found in SR 19:
223-224, 234, 237 , 246, 254,
275, 283, 288, 292? also 16: 2.
127.

60.

SR 16:

61.

ibid.

62.

SR 17:

138-139.

63.

SR 17:

139-140.

64.

SR 19:

583.

65.

SR 19:

583-584.

66.

SR 19:

585, 587-588.

67.

SR 17:

142-144.

68.

SR 17:

354.

69.
Information on the geographical origins of these
votes found in SR 17:
264-266, 354-355, 877?
21:
194.
70.

SR 22:

705-714, quote on p. 706 •

71.

SR 18:

451, 467.

72.

SR 20:

195, 209, 214, 387.

CHAPTER V

"UNTIL A LATER DAY"
POSTPONEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF THE CAPITAL DISPUTE, 1788-1791

North Carolina's general assembly gave the 1788
convention authority to decide several pertinent issues,
including the choice of a capital site.

The convention's

voting on the capital issue demonstrated a final
crystalization of sectionalism along river lines, with the
Neuse Basin serving as the southern front of a northeastern
pact.

Strategic Wake County made a final decision to ally

itself with its Neuse neighbors, while the Cape Fear
Valley, from Moore County to Brunswick and New Hanover,
showed a strengthened unity in its opposition to the
northeast and its alliance with the west.

The events of the

convention's debate, however, caused a reversal of the two
section's stands on the establishment of the seat of
government, which, in turn, led to a new drive to postpone
the coming of a permanent capital.
On 31 July, 1788, Griffith Rutherford of Rowan County,
seconded by John Steele of Salisbury, moved that the
convention "proceed to fix on a proper place for the seat of
government."1 When the measure passed, John G. Blount of
Beaufort County "moved for leave to enter a protest. . .
against the above resolution."2 The next day, Blount
11 4 .
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paradoxically voted to ballot for the capital site.

His

strange action seems at first typical of the overall
geographical distribution of the vote, which was fraught
with exceptions to the previous sectional trends (see Map
8) . Fifteen counties, ranging the length of the state,
offered conflicting votes from among their
representatives.3
The resolution to ballot for a capital site passed in
this strange morass of votes, but the nature of the
convention's voting concealed a continued, and even
strengthened sectionalism on the capital issue.

The

convention allowed each county five representatives
(rather than two as in the assembly's house of commons) with
the additional customary representation of certain towns.
The large number of representatives made for an unusually
high number of conflicting votes within counties.

If,

however, only the majority votes of those counties having
three or more representatives in agreement are considered,
a quite different map emerges (see map 9) . All but two
counties— Dobbs and Carteret— participated in the vote,
and of the participants only Sumner and Beaufort did not
have at least three representatives in agreement.

Mapping

only those majority votes demonstrates the previous
sectional trend still strongly present in 1788, with a
clear northeastern sector battling the establishment of a
capital against and alliance of the west and the Cape Fear
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Only those counties with three representatives in agreement were considered.
Sumner cast only two votes, both against the measure.
Beaufort cast three votes, one for
the measure and two against it.
Carteret and Dobbs did not participate in the vote.
The convention passed this measure 134 to 117.
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region.

Most intriguing was the eastward leaning of

Caswell and Chatham counties.

Of the Neuse Basin counties,

Jones alone did not fall in line.

The capital issue began

in the 1788 convention along the same sectional lines which
had evolved during the previous decade.
The events of 2 August 1788, however, dramatically and
permanently reversed the sections' respective stands on the
capital issue.

The convention resolved that it "would not

fix the seat of government at any one particular point; but
that it will be left at the discretion of the Assembly to
ascertain the exact spot" within "ten miles of the point or
place determined by this Convention."4 Representatives
nominated Smithfield, Tarboro, Fayetteville, New Bern,
Hillsborough, the fork of the Haw and Deep Rivers (see Map
2) , and Isaac Hunter's plantation in Wake County.

At first

no site won a majority of votes, but on a second ballot "Mr.
Isaac Hunter's, in Wake county", was "fixed upon" by a slim
majority of five votes.5 The outcome aroused protest, and
the convention ordered "That such of the members of this
convention, as may think proper, have leave to enter their
protest on the journal against the ordinance for
establishing the seat of government."6
On 4 August William Barry Grove of Cumberland County
presented an official protest, signed by 119 members of the
convention, which attacked the decision for Wake County on
several grounds.

First, they denounced the wisdom of
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choosing a non-urban site:
Dissentient.— Because the establishment
of a seat of government in a place
unconnected with commerce, and where there
is at present no town, will be attended
with a heavy expence to the people, and the
town when established never can rise above
the degree of a village: The experience of
Virginia and Maryland have given a
striking proof of this in the towns of
* Williamsburg and Annapolis.7
Would Grove and his colleagues would have protested had a
rural site in Cumberland County been selected?
The dissentients ended their protest by arguing that the
designation of a ten-mile radius rather than an exact spot
went against the instructions of the general assembly.
They complained:
Because we conceive the place fixed on is
not authorized by the resolution of the
General Assembly, under whose
recommendation the convention met, as that
resolution says 'the convention shall fix
on a particular place? ' whereas by a
resolution of the convention a latitude is
given of twenty miles to a given spot, and
the appointment or selection of the
identical spot now reverts to the
Legislature, contrary to the spirit and
meaning of the constitution.8
One again might ask whether these men would have been
happier had "a particular place" in Wake County been
chosen.
The heart of the signed convention protest, however,
appropriately appeared between these two arguments.

In

this middle section the dissentients clearly demonstrated
sectional antagonism over the capital issue to be built
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upon the factors of trade and economic competion.

They

opposed Wake County:
Because the establishment of the seat of
government at Fayetteville would have a
great and instantaneous effect upon the
decayed commerce of this country, by
holding out immediate advantage to those
who are imployed in the culture of tobacco
and other valuable articles of export, the
principal part of which is now exported
from Virginia and South Carolina.9
These men had hoped that a capital on the Cape Fear River,
such as Fayetteville, would strengthen the trade nexus
connecting the Cape Fear ports and the back country.

Much

of the western area did not lie in the Cape Fear basin at
all, but was drained by rivers which flowed to South
Carolina ports.

Because of the poor navigability of North

Carolina ports (especially in the sounds, but also, to a
lesser degree, at the mouth of the Cape Fear) trade was also
routed north to Virginia.

The protesters claimed concern

for increasing the state's competitive standing with these
other trade networks.

They also sought to strengthen their

relative standing against trade through the sounds (the
Neuse River northward) . Neuse and Albemarle interests
would have likewise desired the capital to be in their
sector so as to strengthen their trade.

Both factions would

have sensed their own trading interests weakened if the
other section won the capital site.
A geographic analysis of the dissentients confirms a
sectional alliance between the Cape Fear region and the
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back country (see Map 10) . Of the 119 signers, the counties
of representation for all but one can be identified.
Without exception, the protestors hailed from the Cape Fear
Valley and the western counties.

Of the counties in the

Neuse River system, only Orange protested, though it must
be remembered that this county lay in both river systems and
•
probably had closer ties
to the Cape Fear region. 10 These
sections which protested the balloting result were the same
ones which strongly favored balloting for a site on 1
August.

Clearly, they had not expected a Neuse River site

to win a majority.
After the convention committed North Carolina to a Wake
County capital, the struggle returned to the general
assembly along the same sectional lines, but with the
ideology of struggle for each side reversed.

From 1788

through 1790 the northeastern representatives fought to
carry into effect the ordinance of the convention, while
the remainder of the representatives generally fought to
prevent the establishment of the seat of government (see
Maps 11 through 15) . The far-western counties proved to be
consistently ambivalent on the capital issue for the
remainder of their existence within the state.
The struggle during those three years became quite
repetitious.

In November 1788 the Cape Fear and western

representatives succeeded in postponing attempts "to carry
into effect the ordinance of the Convention," causing this
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bill to "lie over until the next General Assembly" (see Map
ll)11 In the fall of 1789, forces of opposition actually
defeated this same bill on its second reading in the house
of commons (see Map 12) .12 Later that session, a "bill to
appoint Commissioners for carrying into effect " the
convention1s ordinance was defeated by one vote in the same
house (see Map 13) . Although the house agreed to reconsider
the bill, it was again "negatived.1,13 The northeastern
faction— with the exceptions of Northampton and Jones
Counties— united behind the measure.

In both 1788 and 1789

the votes demonstrated that the seat of government was a
sectional issue.
The sectional struggle continued in the November 1790
session of the general assembly and climaxed in extremely
close role-call votes in both houses on the same day.

This

session met at Fayetteville, and The North-Carolina
Chronicle; or. Fayetteville Gazette set the stage for the
renewed capital debate.

Its 15 November article on the

governor's address to the assembly included this editorial
note:
The following is inserted by the
particular desire of a member of the
general assembly:— It is to be lamented
that among the several matters of a public
nature, recommended by his excellency to
the consideration of the general assembly,
he had entirely forgot, or neglected, the
ordinance of convention for the seat of
government!14
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The governor likely wished he could forget.

It is tempting

to speculate about a northeastern representative
submitting this jab to a Fayetteville newspaper.

What

matters, however, is that the assembly did not forget the
convention ordinance.

On the same day this news article

appeared, a representative from Warren County received
"leave to bring in a bill to carry into effect the ordinance
of the Convention held at Hillsborough. . . entitled fAn
ordinance for establishing a place for holding the future
meetings of the General Assembly. 11,15
By 25 November, both houses had passed the bill once and
were preparing for the second reading.16 In the house of
commons:
The bill. . . was read the second time,
amended, and the question being put,
*Shall this bill pass?1 being objected to,
the house divided, and there were for the
passage fifty-one, and against it fiftyone; whereupon the Speaker gave his vote
and pronounced the passage of the bill.17
The subsequent role call of votes, in which all counties
participated and all voters were identifiable, gave the
clearest picture yet of capital sectionalism (see Map 14) .
The only two counties divided in vote were Orange and
Caswell— by their geographical position understandably
torn between the two factions.
•

•

As for the rest, the vote
•

1A

showed a state divided between two river systems.

The senate then defeated the bill in an equally close
vote.

In that house:
The bill being accordingly read for the
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second time, was put on its passage:
Whereupon, there being an equal number of
votes for and against the passing of the
said bill, the Speaker was called on, who
gave the casting vote and declared that the
bill should be rejected; and the same was
rejected accordingly.19
A senator requested a role-call vote, and all the
senatorial votes were identifiable.

The geographical

interpretation of this second vote, however, was marred by
the nonparticipation of six counties (see Map 15) . Still,
the senate clearly reflected the same sectionalism apparent
in the house. 20
•

The senate journal*s record of the vote, however,
reavealed an intriguing problem.

The senate declared

twenty-four votes for the bill and twenty-four against, but
only twenty-three names were recorded "Against the passage
of this bill."

These names were followed by the written

sum, "24" .21 If the clerk accurately recorded these names,
then the bill should have passed its second reading in the
senate as it had in the house, and the speaker should not
have been allowed to enter his opposing vote to the measure.
The suspiciousness of the 1790 senate vote perhaps
indicated the sharpness of the sectional dispute on the
capital issue.

The closeness of both votes certainly did.

Another indication of sharp sectionalism in that session
was the vote on the site of the next general assembly.

The

votes divided equally— 75 to 75— between Fayetteville and
New Bern.22 On a reballoting, the town on the Cape Fear lost
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to the town on the Neuse, but the sectional statement was
clear.
Although the Cape Fear and the western sections of the
state fought against the enforcement of the convention's
capital ordinance, it is important to realize that they did
not actively attempt to overthrow that ordinance.

Rather,

in their actions there existed a sense of merely postponing
the inevitable— or perhaps of buying time while waiting for
a change in situation.

In 1790 the southern and western

sectors won postponement, but the sucess was short-lived.
That same year, the northeastern faction won its choice of
New Bern as the next assembly site;

in 1791 they would win

their choice of Wake County as the permanent capital site.
Elizabeth Culbertson Waugh describes the final enforcement
of the convention's ordinance:

on 5 December 1791 nine

commissioners were chosen to select an exact site in Wake
County from numerous land tracts offered for sale.

The

commissioners chose a site on Colonel Joel Lane's property,
the government buying one thousand acres from him for
1,378.

This site, later named Raleigh, would become North

Carolina's long-debated permanent seat of government.23
With the selection of Joel Lane's site, the long
evolution of North Carolina's capital issue had reached an
end.

Many of the factors of debate had changed form and

relative importance between the seventeenth century and
1791.

The Lords Proprietors were especially concerned with
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convenience and healthiness in a capital site.

These

factors played prominent roles in the debate during
Johnston and Dobbs's administrations, but after Tryon
neither seemed of great significance.

Smallpox epidemics

influenced assembly meeting sites and probably made certain
towns unnatractive as potential capital sites, but little
concern appeared in the later period for the inherent
healthiness of sites.

Convenience was perhaps the most

driving issue before Tryon's administration.

Except for

the far-western counties, however, it did not appear so
significant after New Bern's fall from capital status.

To

what extent convenience played a silent role in later
capital debates would be hard to determine.

The system of

alliances and the sectional blocs that occurred, however,
made it fairly clear that economics played a more
significant role than convenience in the last decade of
debate.

Under Johnston and Dobbs economic interests in the

capital debate were localized? Dobbs's interest in Tower
Hill and the New Bern/Wilmington rivarly both lacked the
support of strong regional alliances.

After the

Revolution, however, the maturing of North Carolina trade
systems enabled an alliance of Cape Fear and western
interests against the interests of the northeast river
systems.

Representatives of each of the two sections

supported capital sites which, although not necessarily
near, were commercially advantageous.
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Sectionalism had been apparent in the capital issue
since Burrington1s administration.
was to be the one constant factor.

Indeed, sectionalism
Ekirch distinguishes

periods in the eighteenth century when sectional antagonism
waned.

Seen through the window of the capital issue,

however, sectionalism reigned continuously, except for a
brief respite under Tryon when a New Bern capital became
established fact.

Like the relative significance of the

issues, however, sectionalism itself evolved through the
eighteenth century.

Under Burrington, Johnston, and Dobbs,

sectionalism meant conflict between the Cape Fear and
Albemarle regions, with the Neuse River region too unstable
to be considered an ally to either side.

From the official

establishment of a capital at New Bern through the
Revolution a weaker sectionalism appeared between east and
west-— with the coastal Cape Fear region allied to the more
northerly eastern areas.

By 1788, however, the

southeastern coast joined inland Cape Fear in alliance with
the back country.

This alliance opposed a newly firmed

coalition of Neuse River Valley and Albemarle interests.
Although the face of sectionalism evolved, the capital
issue showed North Carolina to be marked by this divisive
force throughout the eighteenth century.
This study has left unanswered many questions about the
seat of government debate.

Especially intriguing is the

relationship-between North Carolina's experience and that
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of other colonies and states.

This turbulent and unsettled

capital situation may at first seem unique.

A fuller study

which included the capital issue in other colonies or
states would not only aid in determining North Carolina's
uniqueness, but also help explain why this state
experienced such a flux.

Donald L. Kemmerer describes a

situation in colonial New Jersey which bore striking
resemblance to North Carolina's quandary.

Proprietary New

Jersey was divided into East Jersey and West Jersey, and
these separate identities were maintained partly by
alternating legislatures between Perth Amboy and
Burlington— -the chief towns of these sections— and equal
assembly representation.

Kemmerer describes a political

measure in 1710 which declared Burlington the sole capital.
The assembly ignored the measure and continued alternating
meeting sites.24 By the 1720's North Carolina had two
specific geographical regions which, though lacking the
Jersey's individual political identities, possessed
political equality through the domination of the executive
branch by Cape Fear interests and the legislative branch by
Albemarle men.
In the Cape Fear, North Carolina had a politically
strong "back country" even early on in the eighteenth
century, if the term could be applied to a coastal region.
As the actual back countries developed throughout the
colonies and became politically stronger in the
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revolutionary era, colonies other than New Jersy showed
situations similar to North Carolina's capital debate.
Virginius Dabney strikes a familiar chord in this
description of Virginia's struggle to choose a new capital:
Agitation for removal of the seat of
government from Williamsburg to a more
central location had been heard for
decades, especially after the capital
there was destroyed by fire in 1747.
Finally, in 1779 the General Assembly
decided to move, but Richmond was chosen by
only a slight majority . . . .25
The Revolution brought flux to Georgia's capital situation
as well.

Savannah was the colony's early and undisputed

capital.

Kenneth Coleman describes that "[w]hile Savannah

again became the capital in 1782, the increased importance
of Augusta and the upcountry led the executive (governor
and council) to reside there part time and the assembly to
alternate between the two cities."26 Perhaps North Carolina
and New Jersey were somewhat ahead of the game in their
early governmental itineracy.

They each had to balance two

politically strong yet geographically distinct regions
before the maturation of western back countries in the
colonies.
This study also does not explain many specific workings
of North Carolina's capital debate, especially in the era
of Revolution.

How did the assembly coalesce on Tryon's

choice of New Bern in 1766 or on the final choice of Joel
Lane's property in 1791? What factors caused the farWestern representatives to vote for or against capital
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bills? Why did the many exceptions to the developing
sectional trends appear?

How did such a strong alliance

between the back country and the Cape Fear region emerge
when so much of the former's trade lay in South Carolina?
These questions could possibly be answered in a more
comprehensive study.

More importantly, the answers to

these and other significant questions could be clarified in
a study which involved more personally the people of the
debate.

Not only is a study of the voting assemblymen

needed, but also a study of their immediate societies which
influenced how they viewed sectionalism and how they voted
on issues affecting the capital.

Real meaning in this

political debate is lost without examining the social
foundations on which assembly votes were erected.
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3. Information on the geographical origins of these
votes found in SR 22:
1-4, 7, 9-16, 26-28.
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924, 928,

963.

18.
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19.
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801-802.

20.
Information on the geographical origins of these
votes found in SR 21: 729-730, 732, 734, 741, 758, 769,
801-802? 22:
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21.
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801-802.

22. The North-Carolina Chronicle; or. Fayetteville
Gazette, vol. 2, no. 11 (22 Nov. 1790).
23. Elizabeth Culbertson Waugh and Editorial Committee,
North Carolina's Capital. Raleigh (Chapel Hill:
The
University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 3-4.
24.
Donald L. Kemmerer, Path to Freedom:
The Struggle
for Self-Government in Colonial New Jersey. 1703-1776
(Cos Cob, Ct.: John E. Edwards, Publisher, 1968?
originally published by Princeton University Press,
1940), pp. 18, 87.
25. Virginius Dabney, Richmond: The Story of a City
(Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1976),
p. 25.
26.
Kenneth Coleman, gen. ed., A History of Georgia
(Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 1977), p. 91.
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APPENDIX
ABOUT THE MAPS
The sources used to compile the maps in this study are
listed in the bibliography.
Each map represents the
influence of two or more of these sources.
Even for the
same time-period, these sources were often in conflict,
so the maps in this study show only approximate
boundaries.
The majority of the maps (Maps 3 through 15)
show the spatial relationships between counties necessary
to geographical interpretation of assembly votes.
The
depiction of the far-western (Tennessee) counties is
especially approximate due to inadequate sources. Much
of the western area bore the designation "Indian Land"
during the late-eighteenth century. These areas are
blank in the maps of assembly voting to more correctly
show the actual areas represented by assemblymen.
Certain towns were represented independently in the
assembly (Edenton, New Bern, Wilmington, Halifax,
Hillsborough, Salisbury, Fayetteville). For simplicity,
I considered each of the town votes to be one among the
votes of its surrounding county.
Thus, if a town's
representative voted differently from his county's
representatives, that county would show mixed voting on
the m a p .
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